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A. Basic Information  
Country: Chad Project Name: 
Local Development 
Program Support 
Project 
Project ID: P066998 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-H1260 
ICR Date: 12/30/2010 ICR Type: Core ICR 
Lending Instrument: APL Borrower: REPUBLIC OF CHAD
Original Total 
Commitment: 
XDR 16.4M Disbursed Amount: XDR 16.3M 
Revised Amount: XDR 16.4M   
Environmental Category: B 
Implementing Agencies:  
 Ministry of Land Management, Urbanism and Habitat  
Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:  
 Agence Française de Développement (AFD)  
 
 
B. Key Dates  
Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual Date(s) 
 Concept Review: 11/08/2001 Effectiveness: 03/28/2005 03/28/2005 
 Appraisal: 11/25/2002 Restructuring(s):   
 Approval: 09/16/2004 Mid-term Review: 06/08/2009 06/08/2009 
   Closing: 06/30/2009 06/30/2010 
 
 
C. Ratings Summary  
C.1 Performance Rating by ICR 
 Outcomes: Moderately Satisfactory 
 Risk to Development Outcome: Moderate 
 Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory 
 Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory 
 
 
C.2  Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) 
Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings 
Quality at Entry: Satisfactory Government: Moderately Satisfactory
Quality of Supervision: Moderately Satisfactory Implementing Agency/Agencies: Moderately Satisfactory
Overall Bank 
Performance: Moderately Satisfactory
Overall Borrower 
Performance: Moderately Satisfactory
vii 
C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators 
Implementation 
Performance Indicators 
QAG Assessments 
(if any) Rating  
 Potential Problem Project 
at any time (Yes/No): 
Yes 
Quality at Entry 
(QEA): 
Moderately 
Unsatisfactory 
 Problem Project at any 
time (Yes/No): 
Yes 
Quality of 
Supervision (QSA): 
None 
 DO rating before 
Closing/Inactive status: 
Moderately 
Satisfactory 
  
 
 
D. Sector and Theme Codes  
 Original Actual 
Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)   
 General public administration sector 16 16 
 Other social services 20 20 
 Primary education 22 22 
 Roads and highways 22 22 
 Water supply 20 20 
 
     
Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)   
 Decentralization 25 25 
 Land administration and management 13 13 
 Municipal finance 13 13 
 Participation and civic engagement 24 24 
 Rural services and infrastructure 25 25 
 
E. Bank Staff  
Positions At ICR At Approval 
 Vice President: Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili Callisto E. Madavo 
 Country Director: Mary Kathryn Hollifield Ali Mahmoud Khadr 
 Sector Manager: Karen Mcconnell Brooks Joseph Baah-Dwomoh 
 Project Team Leader: Soulemane Fofana Noel Rene Chabeuf 
 ICR Team Leader: Bruno Losch  
 ICR Primary Author: Bruno Losch  
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F. Results Framework Analysis 
 
Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) 
PROADEL (Phase 1 of the Local Development Program) would assist the Government of 
Chad in designing and implementing a decentralized and participatory financing 
mechanism that will empower local communities and decentralized authorities to manage 
development funds by (i) strengthening the capacity and responsibility of local 
communities and decentralized authorities, (ii) implementing demand-driven subprojects, 
and (iii) supporting the emerging process of decentralization.  
 
Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority 
 
(a) PDO Indicator(s) 
 
Indicator Baseline Value 
Original Target 
Values (from 
approval 
documents) 
Formally 
Revised 
Target 
Values 
Actual Value 
Achieved at 
Completion or 
Target Years 
Indicator 1 :  75% of targeted communities in the 11 southern #strong intervention# départements that have adopted their Local Development  Plans 
Value  
quantitative or  
Qualitative)  
  75%   100% 
Date achieved  09/17/2004  06/30/2010 
Comments  
(incl. %  
achievement)  
133% 
Indicator 2 :  50% of these communities have at least one subproject whose last financing tranche has been disbursed 
Value  
quantitative or  
Qualitative)  
  50%   83% 
Date achieved  09/17/2004  06/30/2010 
Comments  
(incl. %  
achievement)  
166% 
Indicator 3 :  95% of Decision Committees are in place in the 11 targeted départements and have met at least once 
Value  
quantitative or  
Qualitative)  
  95%   63% 
Date achieved  09/17/2004  06/30/2010 
Comments  
(incl. %  
achievement)  
66% 
 
 
ix 
(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s) 
 
 
Indicator Baseline Value 
Original Target 
Values (from 
approval 
documents) 
Formally 
Revised 
Target Values 
Actual Value 
Achieved at 
Completion or 
Target Years 
Indicator 1 :  N/A 
Value  
(quantitative  
or Qualitative)  
        
Date achieved     
Comments  
(incl. %  
achievement)  
  
 
G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs 
 
No. Date ISR  Archived DO IP 
Actual 
Disbursements 
(USD millions) 
 1 12/15/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 
 2 06/27/2005 Satisfactory Satisfactory 2.53 
 3 12/20/2005 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 3.38 
 4 06/09/2006 Moderately Unsatisfactory 
Moderately 
Unsatisfactory 4.20 
 5 07/12/2006 Moderately Unsatisfactory 
Moderately 
Unsatisfactory 4.20 
 6 12/21/2006 Moderately Unsatisfactory 
Moderately 
Unsatisfactory 5.70 
 7 06/25/2007 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 6.32 
 8 12/13/2007 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 7.18 
 9 05/21/2008 Moderately Unsatisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 9.32 
 10 12/01/2008 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 13.17 
 11 05/29/2009 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 19.31 
 12 11/12/2009 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 23.33 
 13 06/23/2010 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 24.92 
 
 
H. Restructuring (if any)  
Not Applicable 
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Local Development Program Support Project (APL1) 
1.   Project Context, Development Objectives and Design 
1.1  Context at Appraisal 
(a) Country situation and main sector issues  
1. The Local Development Program Support Project (Projet d’Appui au 
Developpement Local - PROADEL) was appraised in 2003.  
2. Poverty in Chad. At the time of appraisal, about 80 percent of the population 
lived on less than one dollar per day. Average annual income per capita was estimated at 
US$250, but there was a marked disparity between rural areas (US$133) and urban areas 
(US$328). Because poverty in Chad has a distinctly rural character, Government 
programs to reduce poverty and increase growth have traditionally targeted rural areas.  
3. Development constraints and rural services. The main constraints to rural growth 
in Chad were identified as: (a) weak and inefficient provision of basic services to rural 
communities, (b) poor organization of rural communities and their limited involvement in 
development decisions, (c) the absence of rural financial services, and (d) the fragility of 
ecosystems. Because PROADEL was designed to support decentralization and to help 
Government authorities and local communities manage development funds at the local 
level, the first two of these constraints were particularly targeted by the preparation team. 
(i) Weak and inefficient provision of basic services to rural communities. At the 
time of appraisal, only 30 percent of the rural population had access to safe 
water, and even in villages that had pumps, many of these pumps were not 
working due to lack of maintenance. Schools were few in number and 
physically inadequate, enrollment rates were low, the quality of education was 
poor and showed wide regional disparities in performance, school attendance 
rates for girls lagged substantially behind those for boys, costs were high, and 
few students continued on to post-primary education. In N'Djamena, there was 
one doctor per 3,904 inhabitants, but nationwide this number was more than 
10 times higher (one doctor per 41,000 inhabitants). One-half of births in 
urban areas were assisted, compared with only 16 percent of births in rural 
areas. Five percent of adult Chadians were infected with the HIV, compared 
with only 2.9 percent in 1994. Out of 6,200 kilometers of roads in the national 
road network, only 300 kilometers were paved. Since most unpaved roads 
were not accessible year-round, the cost of food was high; transport charges 
frequently made up 70 percent of the retail price, and food security was poor.  
(ii) Poor organization of rural communities and their limited participation in 
development decisions. Most rural communities in Chad were poorly 
organized and had limited involvement in decisions concerning their own 
development. The Government of Chad had started decentralizing 
administrative functions and shifting responsibility for the provision of 
administrative services to the local level, but this process was still in the early 
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stages. There were as yet no elected decentralized authorities, and rural 
populations had little or no direct contact with decision-makers. Projects such 
as the Local Initiatives Fund (Fonds d’Actions Concertées d’lnitiative 
Locale—FACIL) and the Agency for Domestic Energy and Environment 
(AEDE) had set up informal decision-making bodies for rural development, 
but these remained in the pilot stage and depended on international donors for 
financial support. 
(b) Government strategy and rationale for Bank assistance 
4. Government strategy on poverty. The PRSP, adopted in 2003, calls for 
sustainably increasing productivity and production, while at the same time reinforcing 
institutional and human capacities. Key elements of the poverty reduction strategy 
include:  
 Raising agricultural productivity and marketing. 
 Strengthening the capacities of existing rural organizations and promoting the 
emergence of new rural organizations. 
 Promoting sustainable management of natural resources. 
 Redefining the Government's role in rural areas through decentralization. 
 Improving the provision of basic services in rural areas (e.g., in education, 
health care, communications, transport). 
5. Government strategy on rural development. In 2003, the Government of Chad 
prepared a comprehensive rural development strategy, which was to be implemented 
through a series of programs and projects including the Rural Development Support 
Program (Programme Intégré de Développement Rural - PIDR). Working within the 
PIDR framework, the World Bank channeled its support to the rural development 
strategy via two “sister” projects, which were prepared, evaluated, and implemented in 
parallel. The Agricultural Services and Producer Organizations Project (ASPOP), which 
closed in 2009, focused primarily on productive investments: it was designed to raise 
agricultural productivity, improve the performance of agricultural markets, and build 
capacity among rural organizations. PROADEL meanwhile focused primarily on social 
investments: it was designed to promote decentralization and accelerate development of 
local communities through the provision of public goods, especially in the areas of water 
and sanitation, health, and education. 
6. Government strategy to address other sector-specific issues. Rural development 
activities in Chad are taking place in the context of an overall effort on the part of the 
Government to decentralize decision-making power and management of public resources.  
The decentralization effort was launched in 1996, when the authorities introduced a new 
system of government that includes five administrative levels (nation, region, 
département, commune, and communauté rurale). Operationalization of the new 
decentralized system lagged, however, and by 2003 when PROADEL was being 
prepared, the legal and regulatory framework had not yet been put in place. 
Consequently, an explicit objective of the project was to help the Government complete 
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the preparation of the new regulatory framework, implement the long-planned 
decentralization measures, and accompany the future communautés rurales. 
7. It was anticipated that activities to be financed under PROADEL might have 
unforeseen environmental and social impacts. To ensure that any such impacts would be 
managed responsibly, an Environmental Assessment (EA) and an Environmental and 
Social Management Framework (ESMF) were prepared before appraisal, with local 
stakeholders involved in the preparation. Procedures needed to mitigate potential adverse 
environmental impacts of project-supported activities were spelled out in the National 
Environmental Action Plan (NEAP) and the Fight Against Desertification National Plan 
(FADN), both of which were prepared prior to appraisal.  
8. Rationale for Bank assistance. The overall goal of the CAS of 2003 was to 
strengthen governance (including institutional arrangements for public resource 
management and service delivery) and to enhance non-oil economic opportunities, while 
reducing sources of vulnerability, particularly for the poor. 
9. PROADEL was seen as helping to expand opportunities for the poor, address the 
unmet needs of rural communities in basic infrastructure services, and reduce sources of 
vulnerability. Moreover, PROADEL was to contribute to the decentralization process. It 
was anticipated that a share of the new oil revenues would be used to finance the needs of 
rural communities, with these needs identified by the communities themselves. The 
project was selected for grant financing because of its importance in the Bank's program 
in Chad and its expected contribution to poverty alleviation. 
10. PROADEL was to be implemented using a Community-Driven Development 
(CDD) approach; the beneficiaries were to become strong and effective participants in 
their own development. The selection of a CDD approach was innovative in the Chadian 
context and consistent with the objectives of decentralization. 
11. Interventions supported under PROADEL were intended to be complemented by 
other Bank-supported activities aimed at developing market linkages and improving the 
road network. Rural roads were to be constructed and maintained through PROADEL; 
market infrastructure was to be developed through the Urban Development Project 
(UDP); and complementary investments in transport were to be made through the 
National Transport Program Support Project (PAPRONAT). 
1.2  Original Project Development Objective (PDO) and Key Indicators 
12. PROADEL was designed as an Adaptable Program Lending (APL) facility, to be 
implemented in three phases over a 12-year period. Following the establishment during 
the first phase of a legally recognized decentralization framework, the idea was to pilot 
investment activities in a few regions during the first phase and to scale up coverage in 
subsequent phases into a fully-fledged national program.  
13. The Project Development Objective (PDO) for PROADEL-1 was to assist the 
Government of Chad in designing and implementing a decentralized and participatory 
financing mechanism that will empower local communities and institutions to manage 
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development funds in a transparent and sound way and according to their own priorities 
and eventually contribute to the decentralization agenda. The PDO was to be pursued 
through three main sets of activities: (a) strengthening the capacity and responsibility of 
local communities and decentralized authorities, (b) implementing demand-driven 
subprojects, and (c) supporting the emerging process of decentralization. 
14. PROADEL-1was intended to cover 19 of the 47 country’s administrative 
departments. Emphasis was to be placed on promoting community development in the 11 
southern departments that produce oil and cotton, as well as piloting models for 
participatory development in eight northern departments in which pastoralism is the 
dominant source of livelihoods. In addition, support would be provided to help the 
Government complete the legal framework for decentralization and support 
democratically elected decentralized authorities. 
15. Key performance indicators. The PAD included 21 key performance indicators 
related to the PDO and to the four project components.1  Because the project was 
designed as the first phase of a three-phase APL, a set of key performance indicators for 
PROADEL-1 was selected as triggers for proceeding to PROADEL-2 (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1:  Performance indicators for PROADEL-1 selected as triggers for 
PROADEL-2 
1. 50 percent of targeted communities have prepared and adopted their Local Development 
Plans in the 11 southern “strong intervention departments” 
2. 50 percent of these communities have at least one subproject whose first financing 
tranche has been disbursed 
3. 75 percent of decision-making committees are in place in these 11 departments and have 
met at least once 
4. Regulatory legal documents on decentralization have been enacted and adopted by the 
national assembly, and 50 percent of the application decrees are available 
5. Timetable for administrative elections (communes and communautés rurales) has been 
defined  
6. At least 0.5 percent of oil revenues devoted to priority sectors are disbursed for 
subprojects that come within the scope of Local Development Plans. 
 
1.3  Revised PDO and Key Indicators, and Reasons / Justification 
16. Toward the end of 2008, when the Project had been under implementation for 
nearly five years, the Government and the World Bank task team decided that the results 
framework needed to be revised for two reasons. Because the Project uses a CDD 
approach, the types and numbers of subproject funding requests submitted by local 
communities could not be known with precision when the Project was being prepared, 
                                                          
1 All performance indicators are displayed in Section 3.2, Table 3. 
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and targets set at the time of appraisal had by then been shown to be off the mark. 
Moreover, the indicators and targets in the results framework reflected the outcomes and 
impacts expected at the conclusion of all three phases of the planned 12-year APL, not 
those that could reasonably be expected at the end of the first phase only.  
17. In light of these considerations, during the Mid-Term Review (MTR) carried out 
in June 2009, the World Bank task team and the Government agreed to modify the results 
framework. The task team subsequently prepared a restructuring proposal that included 
minor revisions to the PDO. The revised PDO formulated in the wake of the MTR reads 
as follows: “Increase access to basic infrastructure services in targeted poor communes 
and improve the capacity of local institutions and communities to manage the 
development process.” In addition to proposing this change to the PDO, the task team 
also proposed to introduce several new performance indicators and to modify the targets 
for a number of existing performance indicators. The modified performance indicators 
are presented in Annex 2.1. 
18. The revised PDO and the modified performance indicators prepared following the 
MTR were never officially approved by the World Bank.2 Nevertheless, they are 
mentioned here because the modified indicators were subsequently used by the project 
M&E unit to track implementation progress, and they were also referred to during 
supervision missions carried out after the MTR.  
1.4  Main Beneficiaries   
19. The main beneficiaries consisted of the people targeted by Local Development 
Plans (LDPs) in the 19 departments in which PROADEL-1 was active.3 Underprivileged 
groups were actively targeted, including women and transhumant herders. 
1.5  Project Components  
20. PROADEL-1 included four components: (1) Financial support to local 
development subprojects, (2) Capacity building for local development stakeholders,  
(3) Support for decentralization, and (4) Project management and information support.  
21. Component 1: Financial support to local development subprojects (US$13.95 
million, of which US$10.12 million in IDA funds). The objective of Component 1 was to 
                                                          
2 Circumstances conspired to prevent the restructuring from being carried out, in that relations between 
the Bank and the Government of Chad were under review when the restructuring package was 
submitted to the CMU in August 2009. By the time relations were clarified (this process ended with the 
ISN of June 2010), the closing date was drawing near, and the CMU decided that there was no longer 
any point in changing the PDO. 
3 The 11 core departments included: Mandoul Occidental, Mandoul Oriental, and Bahr Sara (region of 
Mandoul); Dodje, Lac Weye, Ngourkosso, Tandjile Est, and Tandjile Ouest (regions of Tandjile and 
Logone Occidental); and La Nya Pende, La Pende, and Monts de Lam (region of Logone Oriental). The 
eight additional departments in which PROADEL launched studies and pilot activities included: Chari, 
Baguirmi, Loug Chari, Dababa, Bahr El Gazal, Bahr Koh, Bahr Signaka and Fitri (regions of Chari-
Baguirmi and Kanem). 
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provide matching grants to cofinance subprojects proposed by community-based 
organizations (associations, organizations, and others with legal status) or decentralized 
local government entities (at the commune or communauté rurale level, once established) 
in project areas. After local meetings were organized, each local development community 
(Assemblée communautaire de développement--ACD) would prepare a LDP detailing its 
priorities and listing activities to be financed (as subprojects). 
22. Component 2: Capacity building for local development stakeholders 
(US$18.68 million, of which US$4.58 million in IDA funds). The objective of 
Component 2 was to strengthen the technical and organizational capacity for 
participatory approaches, needs assessments, project management, access to credit, or 
new poverty reduction methods. This component targeted local communities and their 
associations, subprefectoral and departmental decision and approval committees, and 
service providers (training institutions, NGOs, microfinance institutions).  
Component 2 had three subcomponents: 
 Subcomponent 2.1: Support to community participatory assessments and 
local development plan preparation and implementation. This subcomponent 
was to be executed by an opérateur ensemblier (coordinating service 
provider) financed by AFD and recruited through an international invitation to 
tender based on the terms of reference detailed in the Project Implementation 
Manual (PIM). The component was to finance training at the local level for 
participatory appraisals and to pay the  local service providers needed to plan 
and implement the subprojects, as well as to pay for complementary studies 
and pilot operations that would be launched in the pastoral departments, where 
the techniques to be used were different. 
 Subcomponent 2.2: Training programs at the community level. Training 
programs were to be provided by local subcontractors (NGOs) and were to 
include a wide variety of modules determined during the participatory 
assessments.  
 Subcomponent 2.3: Institutional support to microfinance institutions. The 
objective of this subcomponent was to help provide efficient financial services 
to poor communities in rural project areas. These include defining and 
implementing a regulatory framework for rural finance, providing basic 
training for microfinance institutions and communities on savings and credit, 
and reinforcing and expanding existing microfinance institutions through 
feasibility studies, business plans, equipment, and the like. 
23. Component 3: Support for decentralization (US$5.06 million, of which 
US$3.5 million in IDA funds). The objective of Component 3 was to help the 
Government effectively implement its decentralization policy.  
Component 3 had three subcomponents: 
 Subcomponent 3.1: Support for the completion of the legal and regulatory 
frameworks of decentralization. The support was provided to finance studies 
and technical assistance to the Ministry of Decentralization to complete the 
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necessary laws and regulations and to formulate a master plan for 
implementing the decentralization program. 
 Subcomponent 3.2: Capacity building. This subcomponent aimed to 
strengthen the institutional and technical capacities of all key stakeholders in 
the decentralization process at the national, regional, and local levels.  
 Subcomponent 3.3: Support for the definition of land tenure. The project 
would improve the land tenure system in Chad by helping create a reliable 
database on land tenure, define new curricula and research programs on land 
tenure, help collect data needed for PROADEL's activities, and provide 
equipment to support the Chadian Land Tenure Office (CLTO - Observatoire 
Foncier du Tchad).  
24. Component 4: Management and information support (US$8.31 million, of 
which US$4.9 million in IDA funds). Component 4 supported project coordination, 
evaluation, and monitoring. 
Component 4 had two subcomponents:  
 Subcomponent 4.1: Support to project management. Institutional 
arrangements for project implementation consisted of a Steering Committee,4 
a Project Management Unit--PMU (Unité de gestion du projet--UGP), and 
Local Project Management Units—LPMUs (Unité de gestion locale--UGL) in 
each of the three regions where project operations were active. In addition, 
there were Decision Committees for subprojects at the regional level.  
 Subcomponent 4.2: Program monitoring and evaluation. The planned 
management information system consisted of: (a) monitoring of accounting 
and financial information; (b) monitoring and evaluation of project activities; 
and (c) monitoring of development operations and processes.  
25. Causal linkages. The decentralization strategy of the Government was designed 
to promote cooperation between elected authorities (regional and subregional) and rural 
communities, with the goal of jointly managing resources, including future oil revenues 
allocated to priority sectors. As reflected in the PDO, it was therefore deemed necessary 
to: (a) establish a decentralized administrative structure based on formal laws and a well-
defined regulatory framework; (b) provide the facilities and competencies needed to 
operate the structure; and (c) finance local initiatives selected not by the central 
authorities but by stakeholders who are close to beneficiaries or are beneficiaries 
themselves. The activities supported under the project supported this paradigm, although 
it could be argued that they were not always implemented in the optimal order.  
                                                          
4 At the central level, there is a Steering Committee for all the projects of the PIDR, including 
PROADEL and ASPOP. 
 8 
 
1.6  Other significant changes 
26. During implementation, there were no major changes in the project strategy, 
components, or implementation arrangements. Following the MTR project funds were 
reallocated to better reflect the actual demand and use of funds up until that time.  
2.   Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes  
27. Two factors in the external environment affected project implementation: the 
breakdown in relations between the World Bank and the Government of Chad, and the 
civil conflict that gripped the country. The related disruptions slowed implementation of 
project activities and required many subprojects to stop and then re-start again. 
28. Breakdown in relations between the World Bank and the Government of Chad: 
The relationship between the Bank and the Government of Chad was severely strained 
over disagreements concerning the use of oil revenues that negotiated in the context of 
the Chad-Cameroon pipeline project. The Bank stopped its program in Chad in 2006, 
which led to the temporary freezing of disbursements to all projects including 
PROADEL-1. Consequently, project activities slowed or stopped altogether before 
eventually resuming when the situation improved.  
29. Civil conflict: For much of the project implementation period the Government 
was engaged in what amounted to a low-level civil war, with opposition groups based 
inside and outside the country mounting regular armed attacks designed to destabilize the 
economy and overthrow the existing regime. The lack of security in many parts of the 
country, especially rural areas including many of those targeted by the project, often 
made it unsafe for project staff to travel to project sites and/or perform their activities in a 
normal way. In February 2008, the World Bank Country Office was closed following 
rebel attacks on the capital and remained closed throughout the entire year.  
2.1  Project Preparation, Design, and Quality at Entry 
30. The Government fully endorsed the local development approach that PROADEL 
supported. It undertook the responsibility to prepare the three phases by establishing a 
national team (Equipe Nationale d’Instruction du Projet—ENIP) and using funds made 
available through a PPF funded by the Government of Japan. The multidisciplinary 
preparation team included representatives from the Government and from civil society. 
Furthermore, the Government placed PROADEL under a multisectoral Steering 
Committee composed of eight ministries to oversee the program (the same Committee 
supervises other rural sector projects). Prior to appraisal, the Government also organized 
preparation of the operations, financial, and M&E manuals. 
31. Project preparation benefited from: (a) analytical work done when the national 
and sector-specific strategies were being developed (see Section 1.1.b); (b) lessons 
learned from other rural development projects, including CBD/CDD projects carried out 
not only in Chad but also in other African countries; (c) lessons learned from several 
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community-based development projects preceding this project; and (d) lessons learned 
from a number of bilateral projects for local development in Chad.  
32. Technical support on the design of Component 3 was provided by FENU which 
was already active in Chad, and the appraisal mission included a decentralization and 
governance consultant who provided background support.   
33. The design decided by the preparation team included  a range of activities, 
including building capacity for planning of local development and implementing 
subprojects, transferring financial resources to communes and communities, 
strengthening financial management and procurement systems, introducing new policies 
and regulations for decentralization, and bolstering natural resource management.  
34. The PDO was appropriate in light of the long-term development objectives of the 
overall 12-year program. At the same time, because the PDO related to the overall 
program goals, it did not lend itself easily to the definition of the detailed performance 
indicators needed to measure the achievements of the first phase of the project.  
35. The design of the project and its components were appropriate. The program was 
intended to (a) run for an extended period; (b) cover multiple sectors; (c) encourage 
active participation of all population groups within the targeted communities; (d) develop 
and test decentralized financial management mechanisms; (e) provide mechanisms for 
financing local initiatives while attempting to ensure long-term viability of ecosystems 
and natural resources; and (f) facilitate making local governments or the private sector 
responsible for providing services previously provided by the central government.  
36. The project design prudently called for project operations to be launched initially 
in one region only, with the objective of gaining experience before the approach was 
extended to other regions. In retrospect, it is apparent that the scaling up proceeded very 
slowly and it now seems that work in the two other regions should have been started 
simultaneously in the second year, rather than being phased in over two years.  
37. Most risks and mitigating measures were appropriately conceived. Two risks were 
arguably underestimated:  (a) the risk that planned capacity-building efforts might not be 
sufficient to ensure rapid and successful adoption by participating community 
organizations of decentralized financial management measures (including procurement 
activities), and (b) the risk that local administrations would require additional resources 
to be able to perform their functions effectively (see Annex 6—Stakeholder workshops).    
2.2  Implementation 
38. No major changes were made during implementation to the project design, and 
the project was never formally at risk, although risks inherent in the environment were 
high as noted earlier.  
39. The Project succeeded in implementing most of the planned activities, and 
significant impacts were achieved. Selected achievements are summarized in Table 2. 
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Table 2:  Main accomplishments of PROADEL-1 
Component 1:  
Local development 
subprojects 
 247 classrooms constructed, providing 27,800 children 
with access to modern education facilities 
 205 improved water supply points constructed or 
rehabilitated, providing access to clean potable water to 
219,600 people 
 11 health centers constructed, providing access to health 
care facilities to 41,500 people 
 More than 80,000 cattle provided with access to secure 
watering points 
Component 2:  
Capacity building of local 
stakeholders 
 5,215 local development assemblies and 210 cantonal 
development selection committees established 
 174 Local Development Plans adopted 
 312 subprojects management committees created 
Component 3:  
Support for 
decentralization 
 Six laws enacted on decentralization, along with 47 
decrees preparing the ground for local elections (planned 
for 2011) 
 
40. Several factors can be singled out as having contributed to the successful 
implementation experience: 
(i) Throughout implementation, the demand for project services was very 
strong, both with regard to financing of subprojects and with regard to 
supporting decentralization.  
(ii) The Government maintained its strong commitment to the project, 
participating in supervision missions, facilitating communication with the 
Bank, expediting the transfer of funds from the Bank, providing guidance 
through the Steering Committee, and ensuring a supportive policy 
environment  
(iii) Supervision missions, although not carried out as frequently as planned 
because of the protracted cessation of the Bank’s operations in Chad, were 
characterized by strong collaboration between the Bank task team and 
project staff. These missions generated important feedback to the 
implementing authorities about the performance of the project, which helped 
to make up for the weak performance of the project M&E system during the 
first two years (see 2.3 below). 
(iv) Financial and technical support provided by the co-financier (Agence 
Francaise de Developpement) allowed field operations to proceed without 
interruption after the initial delay of eight months (caused by the difficulty 
of recruiting the Opérateur Ensemblier). 
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41. During the project life cycle, however, implementation was slowed by a number 
of problems:  
(i) Unfortunate timing of effectiveness: The IDA grant was approved on 30 
September 2004. However, due to delays in hiring the project coordinator, 
implementing the computerized accounting system, and transferring 
Government counterpart funds, the grant was declared effective only on 28 
March 2005, and the special accounts received initial deposits of funds only 
in May 2005. This meant that the project had only four months in 2005 to 
implement activities before the onset of the rainy season. 
(ii) Slow recruitment of project staff: The international procurement procedure 
used to recruit the coordinating service provider funded by AFD took eight 
months; since the coordinating service provider was needed to build 
capacity in local communities and prepare local development plans, all 
activities in Components 1 and 2 were delayed. 
(iii) Cessation of World Bank programs in Chad: The year 2006 began with the 
halt of all World Bank programs in Chad, meaning that the planned first-
quarter activities were transferred to the second quarter. In addition, the 
annual plan and budget of the project for 2006 was approved by the Steering 
Committee only in August, thus restricting the use of Government 
counterpart funds. 
(iv) Civil disturbances: Due to rebel attacks, the World Bank office in Chad 
remained closed throughout 2008, slowing the processing of replenishment 
requests. Security operations directed against the rebels disrupted fieldwork 
from February to April.  
42. Four other factors adversely affected the speed and quality of implementation:  
(i) Seasonal factors: Many project-supported activities could be implemented 
only during the dry season (four or five months), when beneficiaries were 
not actively engaged in agricultural activities. 
(ii) Non-availability of counterpart funds: Delays in the payment of counterpart 
funds, and the Government’s failure to honor all of its counterpart funds 
commitments, prevented timely implementation of some project-supported 
activities.5  
(iii) Cash flow problems: Transfer of project funds from N’Djamena to field 
locations and ACDs were difficult to arrange, in part because financial 
institutions are scarce in Chad. Delays in moving funds to the field were 
exacerbated by a cash-flow bottleneck that arose because of the very low 
limits that had been imposed on the two Special Accounts (these were 
originally set at US$505,000 and US$320,000 equivalent; only after the 
                                                          
5 It should be noted, however, that after the Project closed, the Government has continued to provide 
funding, thus allowing the project implementation unit to retain core staff and to continue 
implementation of non-completed subprojects.  
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midterm review were they raised to US$1 million and US$640,000, 
respectively). 
(iv) Inconsistencies in project management: Due to management shortcomings 
pointed by the MTR, at the end of 2009 the Government replaced nearly all 
of the management staff. Identification of a new Project Coordinator proved 
very challenging, in part because of political reasons. Eventually the 
supervising ministry (Ministry of Land Management, Urbanism and 
Habitat) exerted its authority and brokered the appointment of a new Project 
Coordinator. From that point on, implementation performance picked up 
again 
43. As a consequence of the slow start and the many delays experienced during 
project implementation, the MTR originally scheduled to take place in March 2007 was 
significantly delayed. The MTR took place only in June 2009, 60 months after 
effectiveness was declared. Because of the lateness of the MTR, the project closing date 
was extended by one year.  
2.3  Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization 
44. Design.  Planning of the M&E system started before project appraisal. The 
manual was validated by the World Bank in 2004 with minor changes.  
45. As designed, the M&E system had four major weaknesses: 
(i) Overly ambitious design: The original results framework was too 
ambitious and contained indicators that were challenging to measure under 
the difficult conditions prevailing. 
(ii) Excessive data collection requirements: Some of the M&E data could 
only be collected through formal surveys carried out annually. 
(iii) Inadequate resources: The resources allocated for M&E activities were 
inadequate.  
(iv) Missing baseline: Baseline data were not collected at project inception. A 
basic review of the existing infrastructure in the departments covered by the 
project was prepared only in November 2007. The lack of a detailed 
baseline proved to be a major limitation at the evaluation stage. 
46. Implementation. During the first two years of implementation, the M&E system 
was unable to generate more than the most basic data on project activities, and the M&E 
function was consistently rated unsatisfactory by the supervision team during four years. 
These unsatisfactory ratings continued until the MTR (June 2009), when several one-off 
studies were carried out, these studies made clear that the original targets for subprojects 
were seriously flawed, and  the World Bank task team and project management agreed 
that the targets for several key performance indicators should be revised.  
47. The M&E system did manage to generate basic information about project 
activities. Twenty-five out of the 28 scheduled quarterly and annual reports were 
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completed on time (89 percent), and at the time of the ICR mission, project management 
was able to report on: (i) progress achieved against the original indicators; (ii) progress 
achieved against the “revised” indicators introduced at the time of the MTR; (iii) progress 
achieved against the Phase 2 triggers; and (iv) capacity building activities. However, the 
beneficiary survey planned at appraisal and the impact survey was still being completed 
when the ICR was being prepared. Preliminary results were transmitted at the end of 
November 2010, but the quality was compromised by methodological shortcomings 
compounded by a lack of baseline data.  
48. Utilization. The data on project activities generated by the M&E system, while 
not very sophisticated, were used to good effect by project management and by World 
Bank supervision teams. Data produced by the M&E unit were also used to prepare 
detailed annual work plans, and these plans, in combination with financial management 
information, allowed project management to halt the approval of new subprojects before 
project funds became overcommitted. 
2.4  Safeguards and Fiduciary Compliance 
49. Safeguard policies. Four World Bank safeguard policies were triggered by the 
project: OP 4.01 (Environmental Assessment), OP 4.04 (Natural Habitats), OP4.11 
(Physical Cultural Resources), and 4.12 (Involuntary Resettlement). An Environmental 
Assessment (EA) and an Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMP) 
were prepared prior to appraisal. Based on the recommendation of the appraisal mission, 
project management recruited environmental and social specialists for the head office and 
for the regional offices. Beginning in the second year of implementation, the project 
transferred responsibility for selected environmental activities to the Volet Gestion 
Communautaire des Ecosystems (VGCE), a Government project that was tasked with 
handling environmental management issues for several rural development projects, 
VGCE was effective in providing environmental management services during the 
identification, preparation, and implementation  of subprojects. World Bank supervision 
missions consistently rated compliance with applicable safeguard policies as satisfactory.  
50. Fiduciary compliance. Project accounts, including special accounts and regional 
subaccounts, were audited regularly. According to the auditors’ reports, many of the 
accounts contained numerous irregularities up until the last year, but these errors were 
mostly minor in nature, and only one audit report was qualified (the annual audit for 
FY2006). The irregularities identified by the auditors were successfully addressed, and 
all of the audits were eventually approved. The performance of the project’s financial 
management system was mixed.  Because the planned financial management system 
(based on TOMPRO software) was never fully implemented, production of quarterly 
reports was impeded, and annual plans suffered because they could not be subjected to 
rigorous financial analysis. Throughout the life of the project, there were problems with 
the transfer of funds and delayed payments to service providers (see Annex 6).  
51. Every supervision mission of the Bank carried out a procurement review. The 
performance of the procurement team that operated out of the project’s main office was 
consistently rated satisfactory, but it was pointed out on numerous occasions that Local 
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Development Committees sometimes failed to follow required procurement procedures. 
Because of the recurring problems with community-level procurement, the performance 
of the procurement function was rated moderately unsatisfactory in 2007 and 2008. 
2.5  Post-completion Operation / Next Phase 
52. The Government of Chad remains firmly committed to continuing the PROADEL 
APL series and has signaled its desire to scale up the program and to increase the 
coverage to include the entire national territory. Based on the performance of first phase, 
and taking into account the fact that the Phase 2 triggers have been met, preparation of 
PROADEL-2 was well underway in December 2010 when this ICR was being finalized. 
3.   Assessment of Outcomes  
3.1  Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation 
53. The project design, comprising four components, is appropriate. 
54. The objectives of the Project are as relevant now as they were at appraisal. 
Poverty rates in Chad have come down somewhat since the Project was prepared, but 
poverty remains widespread throughout the country and is especially prevalent in rural 
areas.  
3.2  Achievement of the Project Development Objective (PDO) 
55. Evaluation of the achievement of the PDO is problematic, for three reasons. First, 
the PDO was formulated in terms that are worded very vaguely, making precise 
measurement difficult.6 Second, because the project uses a CDD approach, the activities 
to be financed could not be predicted accurately at the time of appraisal, so the targets set 
in the PAD for many output indicators were at best only “guesstimates.” Third, many of 
the original targets were modified after the MTR, and although the modified targets were 
never formally adopted, they were reported on by the project team. 
56. Progress achieved against the original indicators. Despite these challenges, the 
effectiveness of the project in meeting its PDO can be evaluated based on the progress 
achieved in relation to the original indicators. Table 3 shows the achievements against the 
21 original indicators given in the PAD, four of which are related to the general 
objectives and 17 of which are related to the sub-component objectives. In five cases the 
target values not achieved.7 These five cases involve indicators related to the subprojects 
that were financed under Component 1, a significant number of which could not be 
completed prior to the Project closing date due to delays in payment of counterpart funds. 
                                                          
6  Section 1.2 reports the wording of the PAD and the Grant Agreement is not more precise: “to empower 
local communities and decentralized authorities to manage development funds.” 
7  Three indicators are not applicable due to change in Government’s policy, absence of selection by the 
local communities, and rescheduling. One output indicator is unavailable. 
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All of the targets for indicators associated with Components 2, 3, and 4 were fully 
achieved, and most were significantly exceeded.  
 
Table 3:  PDO Indicators and Achievements against Original Targets8 
PDO General Objectives Achieved Achieved as   % of target Notes 
75% of targeted communities in the 11 southern 
“strong intervention” départements that have 
adopted their Local Development Plans  100% 133% 
170 communities adopted 
their LDP in the southern 
departments 
50% of these communities have at least one 
subproject whose last financing tranche has been 
disbursed 
83% 166% 
256 out of 308 subprojects 
reached the last financing 
tranche 
95% of Decision Committees are in place in the 
11 targeted départements and have met at least 
once 
63% 66% 10 out of 16 Decision Committees have met 
At least 300 villages in the N’Djamena wood 
fuel supply basin and 100 villages in the 
Moundou and Sahr basin sustainably manage 
their wood resources 
-- -- 
The GoC prohibited the use 
of wood fuel in 2008 and the 
related actions were 
cancelled 
Component 1:  
Support to local development subprojects  
  
70% of approved subprojects are completed 84% 120% 341 out of 405 approved subprojects completed  
80% of local beneficiaries contributions are 
actually paid 34% 43% 
CFA279.1m out of 
CFA817.5m paid 
At least 300 classrooms have been built or 
rehabilitated  247 82% 
280 classrooms to be 
achieved by December 2010 
At least 350 water supply infrastructures have 
been built or rehabilitated 205 59% 
244 to be achieved by 
December 2010 
At least 20 health posts have been built or 
rehabilitated 11 55%  
At least 50 km of rural roads have been built or 
rehabilitated  -- -- 
No rural roads selected in 
the LDPs 
 
                                                          
8 Sources: for the PDO indicators, the Project Appraisal Document; for the achievements, the 
Government’s ICR dated October 2010 and additional data and information provided by the PROADEL 
Monitoring and Evaluation Unit. The PAD also included two mid-term review indicators (for 
Component 1 and 2); these are not presented here.  
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Table 3 (continued):  PDO Indicators and Achievements against Original 
Targets9 
Component 2: Capacity building to local 
development stakeholders    
70% of infrastructures carried out under 
subprojects are well maintained and operational 94% 127%  
Implementation ratio of the training plans 
established by the LPMUs to the benefit of 
CBOs reaches 60% 
78% 130% 612 completed out of 784 planned training sessions 
10% of the training are specifically intended to 
vulnerable groups 25% 250% 
3,536 women, youths and 
herders received training  
out of 14,388 people 
10 microfinance institutions have been 
established or strengthened 20 200%  
Component 3: Support for decentralization Achieved Achieved as   % of target Notes 
Decentralization legal texts have been adopted 
by the national Assembly and 50% of 
application texts projects are available 
68% 136% 
6 laws adopted and 47 out of 
69 application texts 
available 
Implementation of training plans established to 
the benefit decentralized authorities reaches 60% 87% 145% 
52 out of 60 planned 
training sessions completed 
The 3 CLTO decentralized units are operational 3 100%  
10 pilot decentralized governments (commune 
level) have been evaluated and 8 of them are 
capable of receiving and managing public 
financial resources  to take over local 
development 
-- -- 
Election of decentralized 
governments has been 
postponed to June 2011 
Component 4:  
Management and information support  
  
70% of activity reports produced by the 
execution authorities of the project and by the 
communities are rated satisfactory 
n.a. n.a. Activity reports are reported to be generally satisfactory 
80% of the reports to be prepared by the PMU 
under the project monitoring and evaluation 
manual have been issued in a timely manner 
89% 111% 25 out of 28 planned reports timely issued 
80% of contracts signed by the PMU have been 
executed on time 100% 125% 
All contracts signed 
executed on time 
 
57. Progress achieved against the “revised” PDO indicators. Additional insights 
into the performance of the Project can be obtained by examining the progress achieved 
against the revised indicators (see Annex 2.1). Even though the revised indicators were 
never formally adopted, they reflect what the World Bank team and the Government felt, 
in the wake of the MTR, were reasonable outcomes for the project. Many of the revised 
indicators were less ambitious than the original indicators presented in the PAD, so the 
                                                          
9 Sources: for the PDO indicators, the PAD; for the achievements, the Government’s ICR dated October 
2010 and additional data and information provided by the PROADEL M&E Unit. The PAD also 
included two MTR indicators (for Component 1 and 2); these are not presented here.  
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rate of progress achieved against the targets was generally higher, especially for 
Component 1.10 
58. Progress achieved against the Phase 2 trigger indicators. A final measure of the 
performance of the project is provided by the trigger indicators (see Annex 2.2). For all 
trigger indicators, the targets set in the PAD were reached or exceeded, with the 
exception of Trigger 8 (percentage of oil revenues devoted to priority sectors). For this 
indicator, monitored data do not allow effective measurement.  
59. The composite picture that emerges based on the different sets of indicators is that 
the PDO has been substantially met. All of the many partners and stakeholders contacted 
by the ICR mission agreed on this fundamental conclusion (see Annexes 5 and 6).  
3.3  Efficiency 
60. Consistent with ICR guidelines, since economic analysis was not carried out at 
the time of appraisal, economic analysis was not carried out for the ICR. The appraisal 
mission concluded that the Project did not lend itself to cost-benefit analysis, for two 
main reasons: (i) benefits could not be defined prior to implementation, because the 
subproject investments could not be identified ex ante due to the use of the CDD 
approach; and (ii) the activities most likely to be financed under the project produce 
benefits that are difficult to quantify in economic terms (e.g., strengthened institution, 
reinforced human capacity, improved and more transparent governance, improved 
welfare of rural populations).  
61. The appraisal mission anticipated that a useful approach for evaluating the 
effectiveness of the Project would be to analyze least-cost alternatives for implementing 
project-financed activities. The appraisal mission did not perform any ex ante analysis of 
least-cost alternatives, but the Project M&E unit did collect and save data on the numbers 
and costs of different types of Project-supported subprojects. Using these data, the ICR 
mission was able to compute average costs of representative Project-supported 
subprojects. This analysis is presented in Annex 3. Because most of the contracts to 
implement subprojects were approved using the World Bank’s simplified bidding 
procedures (which require that a minimum of three valid bids be received for each 
contract that is tendered), the average costs associated with Project-supported subprojects 
provide useful information that should help to inform the design of future operations, 
including PROADEL-2 which is currently under preparation. 
62. The economic benefits generated by the Project are discussed in the impact 
assessment commissioned by the Government, a draft of which was made available to the 
ICR mission. Although the impact assessment suffered from a number of methodological 
weaknesses that cast doubt on the accuracy of many findings, the report points out that 
the FCFA7.7 billion worth of subprojects financed under PROADEL-1 generated 
substantial benefits in terms of local employment and income generation. The draft 
                                                          
10 The revised indicators are mentioned here because they were consistently reported in supervision 
missions carried out following the MTR, but since they were never formally adopted, they are of minor 
importance for purposes of this ICR. 
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impact assessment documents the involvement of 76 local construction firms, 10 
furniture makers, 34 consulting engineers, 26 environmental consultants, and 287 
miscellaneous goods providers. 
3.4  Justification of Overall Outcome Rating 
Rating:  Moderately satisfactory.  
63. The overall outcome of a project is assessed taking into account the extent to 
which the project development objectives were achieved or are expected to be achieved. 
The Project recorded significant accomplishments: most of the targets specified in the 
results framework have been met or exceeded, the remaining unfinished subprojects are 
all being completed, and efforts continue to ratify pending legislation on decentralization. 
The overall outcome is therefore rated as Moderately satisfactory.  
 Although assessment of project achievements is hampered by a lack of data, it 
is clear that the development objective and most output targets were 
essentially achieved, and many targets were exceeded. The performance 
triggers for advancing to the second phase of the project were met, with the 
exception of Trigger 8, for which data collection was difficult (due to budget 
posting issues). 
 Competitive procurement was used for most subprojects, with the goal of 
reducing implementation costs below the level that would have been incurred 
had normal government implementation procedures been used.  
64. Several factors militate against assigning a higher rating for project outcomes:  
 At the time the Project closed, more than 60 subprojects had not yet been 
completed, despite the fact that the closing date had been extended by a year.  
 Several important legal documents on decentralization prepared under the 
Project remain to be processed. 
 Due to difficulties faced by the M&E system and the unavailability of the 
final impact assessment at the time of the completion of the ICR report, data 
permitting more rigorous economic analysis of the performance of subprojects 
are not available, making difficult the quantification of project benefits. 
3.5  Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts 
(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development 
65. With available data it is not possible to assess the degree to which poverty has 
been reduced in the areas targeted by the project (three out of the country’s 22 regions).  
66. Gender and youth issues. The original PAD indicated that “women, youth, 
transhumant herders, and other underprivileged groups would be actively targeted.” 
Among the 405 subprojects financed under the project, only two are owned by women; 
the remaining 403 subprojects all have both men and women as members and 
beneficiaries. This does not alter the fact that PROADEL-1 has been instrumental in 
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promoting the welfare of women and in improving their status in the communities where 
the project is active. With 23% of the total cost of subprojects dedicated to water 
infrastructure and sanitation, the draft impact assessment rightly notes their specific 
impact on women and youth. The project led to a significant decrease of water chores for 
women, and reduction of fecal and water-related diseases for children. Women 
participate on project committees at all levels, and the ICR mission noted that all ACDs 
for village groups and subprojects have at least one or two women members. Youth are 
even better represented in the ACDs; each subproject that the ICR team visited had a 
minimum of two or three youths represented on the ACD. The ICR mission also observed 
that other underrepresented groups, such as transhumant herders, did not participate to the 
same extent in ACDs because of their transient way of life. However, almost all LDPs 
include provisions for sustainable land management activities, which typically provide 
safe passage corridors for livestock and watering points (see Annex 5, section 4). 
(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening 
67. Processes and procedures introduced under PROADEL-1, which were used to 
prepare local development plans in a participatory manner, select priority investments, 
and take investment decisions, are today being used not only in regions targeted by the 
project, but also in other regions throughout the country.  
68. In addition to serving as a model, the project helped build capacity in the central 
institutions that implemented the project. The Ministries of Land Management and 
Decentralization in particular benefited through material support and training (capacity-
building), while agencies located in the regions benefited from modernization of 
communication and other equipment. A particularly important contribution, and one that 
was not anticipated at the time of appraisal, was the provision of equipment to the Land 
Tenure Office (Observatoire Foncier du Tchad) and the construction of three branch 
offices. Every group of stakeholders contacted by the ICR mission agreed that without 
PROADEL (and to some extent its agricultural sister project, ASPOP), the Government’s 
decentralization efforts would not have made nearly as much progress (see Annex 6—
Stakeholders’ workshops).  
(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative) 
69. Under Component 1, support was to be provided to the Agence pour l’Energie 
Domestique et l’Environnement, to allow completion of activities that had been initiated 
under the IDA-funded Household Energy Project (CR 30820 CD, closed on June 30, 
2004). The purpose of PROADEL-1 support was to create structures at the village level 
to allow sustainable management of fuel wood resources. This activity languished under 
PROADEL-1, and in 2007 the Government decided to cancel the program. 
3.6  Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops 
70. Beneficiary survey. No beneficiary survey was carried out. The draft impact 
assessment displays results for 564 questionnaires which are statistically unusable. 
However qualitative feedback from beneficiaries shows a high level of satisfaction for all 
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subprojects, except for those involving water infrastructures (a significant number of 
wells financed by the Project were reported to have gone dry). During the course of 15 
field visits carried out by the ICR mission, almost 100 project beneficiaries were 
interviewed, as well as members of project committees, and local administrations. The 
outcomes of this “mini beneficiary’s survey” are summarized in Annex 5.  
71. Stakeholder workshops. The ICR mission interviewed stakeholders individually 
or in small groups. Key findings of the stakeholder interviews are summarized in Annex 
6. The key lessons learned identified by stakeholders appear below in Section 6—
Lessons Learned. This section presents some highlights of the proposed lessons:  
 Phasing of project-supported activities was appropriate because of local 
capacity constraints. Even though the project design was relatively simple, 
and despite the fact that the participatory approach had been introduced earlier 
under PROADEL’s sister project, ASPOP, it was important for PROADEL to 
be launched in only one region, and then extended to other regions in 
subsequent years. 
 Late payment (and in some cases non-payment) of service providers were 
chronic problems. In future, measures must be found to ensure that project 
managers and beneficiaries in charge of implementing subprojects respect 
contractual conditions and payment schedules. Engineering firms, 
construction firms, and other service providers must be paid in a timely 
fashion. A guarantee fund or payment system should be developed in case 
ACD committees abandon their subproject or misuse the allocated funds. The 
loss should not fall on the service providers who have done their work 
properly. 
 Contracts for implementation of subprojects should not only provide general 
guidance on technical specifications and costs, but also should take into 
account specific conditions that are likely to vary from one subproject to the 
next (for instance, additional transport costs should be included for 
subprojects located in remote locations).  
 Many local ACDs that awarded contracts for project-supported subprojects 
were initially unfamiliar with competitive bidding procedures such as those 
required for selection of service providers. During the first phase of 
PROADEL, some mistakes occurred that were subsequently remedied by 
training, but additional training will be needed even in PROADEL-1 project 
areas to consolidate local knowledge. A priority activity for procurement 
officers during Phase 2 should be to organize procurement and simple 
financial training in the field. 
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4.   Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome  
Rating: Moderate 
72. Risks to the development outcome and sustainability of project achievements are 
assessed against technical, institutional, economic/financial, social and environmental, 
political (including the Government’s commitment), and stakeholder criteria. These are 
evaluated briefly below in relation to potential decentralization, subprojects’ viability, 
and institutional concerns.  
73. Decentralization and financing of the established decentralized organs. The 
Government of Chad has been working on decentralization since the 1990s, with 
relatively modest results to date. However, the Government’s current commitment to 
continued decentralization cannot be questioned, especially in view of the already fixed 
election agenda. Of greater concern is the financial capacity of the central and 
decentralized public-sector units to perform their duties and provide services initiated by 
PROADEL funds. Mitigating this risk are the nearly finalized legal framework; the 
capacity-building that has already taken place in target regions, departments, and sub-
prefectures; the rise in oil revenue for the Government; and the improvement in 
collection of taxes and other funds by regional and lower-level administrative units. 
Considering the enormity of the task of spreading decentralization to all 22 regions of 
Chad, the cost element cannot be ignored, however. The risk of rapid development in 
decentralization—which will take place during the second and third phases of 
PROADEL--is estimated as moderate, even when the funds provided by the World Bank 
grant are considered. (Other donors are waiting for actual results and elections before 
committing themselves to provide additional funds for decentralization.)  
74. Viability of subprojects. The ICR mission and most of the supervision missions 
concluded that nearly all subproject structures financed under PROADEL are technically 
sound and well constructed. However, the economic viability of the subprojects financed 
under PROADEL-1 remains uncertain, and many subprojects (such as schools and health 
centers) must rely on public-sector financing to carry on their operations.  These 
subprojects do generate significant non-monetary benefits, but their viability must be 
ensured nonetheless. In contrast, all local water and economic subprojects (butcheries, 
storing depots) have or will have subproject committees that collect money from users in 
order to be ready for maintenance expenditures when needed. PROADEL has, throughout 
its existence, insisted on budgeting and collecting enough funds for subprojects to ensure 
good maintenance of their investments, regardless of whether they are for productive or 
social purposes. In this respect, improved fundraising by decentralized administrative 
units, already mentioned, could provide some help for social subprojects. (This support 
would not have to cover 100 percent of operational and maintenance charges, however, 
as social subprojects are capable of collecting small fees from beneficiaries - see Annex 
5.) The risk of failing to maintain subprojects is evaluated as moderate, mainly because 
the social infrastructures require public funds. 
75. Experienced staff for PROADEL. Since the project was formally closed, funding 
constraints have forced the laying off of many project staff in the project head office and 
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almost all staff in regional offices, except for the M&E officers and some unskilled 
workers (cleaners, security guards). Even the project administrator is on a temporary 
transfer from another project (VGCE). The erosion in implementation capacity will be 
hard to reverse quickly. Replacement staff needed for the follow-on phase will be easy to 
find, but few will come with appropriate experience. It led to the selection of an 
international consulting firm to do the hiring. Bringing new staff up speed will take time, 
although the challenge will be mitigated by the existence of manuals and training 
materials developed during PROADEL I. This issue remains sensitive but the risk of not 
having experienced staff for PROADEL 2 is evaluated as low if adequate measures are 
taken in terms of selection and adequate complementary training. 
76. All other risks (technical, social, environmental, and stakeholder commitment) are 
considered negligible.  
5.   Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance  
5.1  Bank Performance  
(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry  
Rating: Satisfactory.  
77. The role of PROADEL was to complement its agricultural sister project, ASPOP, 
in helping the Government to operationalize its Rural Development Support Program 
(PIDR) and improve the provision of basic services in rural areas. In addition, project 
financing was needed for a related program, that is, decentralization of Government 
administration and services. The Bank had earlier committed to supporting Chad’s 
strategy for poverty reduction, and key elements in that strategy were decentralization 
and community-based or -driven development. The Bank also financed a Project 
Preparation Facility and advised the Government on the preparation and shared 
experience from similar projects, for instance, in Burkina Faso and Niger. The appraisal 
mission considered several alternatives, but eventually chose a long-term financing 
mechanism (APL), a CDD approach which was still evolving in its conception with 
reference to other projects, multi-activity intervention, and whole-hearted support for 
decentralization. In view of the poverty-reduction strategies of the Government, the 
objectives of the project were fully relevant at the time of preparation and the 
components were appropriate.  
78. With the limited financial resources available, concentration on three regions—
sufficiently diverse to generate a good experience base to inform later scaling-up efforts--
was justified. The risk assessment was generally appropriate, although the Bank’s design 
team should have better anticipated the challenges posed by a new type of project, the 
large size of the country, and long distances to the necessary service providers. Phasing 
the start-up of project-supported activities over a two- to three-year period was a practical 
choice, but the plans should have emphasized intensive training and guidance at all levels 
to avoid the slow pace of implementation in the early years. Also, even though the M&E 
manual was prepared well before appraisal, the M&E system turned out to be too 
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ambitious, and the systems eventually put in place to ensure collection of M&E data were 
inadequate, especially when it came to evaluating the project impacts.  
79. Consistent with Bank policies prevailing at the time, the project design was not 
subjected to a formal quality-at-entry review.  Improvements to the project design were 
discussed extensively during the decision meetings (which included participation of the 
Quality Assurance Group—QAG) and during the presentation of the project to the 
Bank’s Board of Executive Directors.  
(b) Quality of Supervision  
Rating: Moderately satisfactory 
80. World Bank task teams carried out nine supervision missions during the project 
period and monitored implementation progress by reading the quarterly and annual 
reports produced by project management and by engaging in correspondence with 
Government officials and the project management team (particularly for no-objections). 
World Bank supervision missions were less frequent than would normally have been the 
case because World Bank operations in Chad were first suspended and then disturbed by 
the civil conflict (the Country Office closed for a full year). Generally speaking, the team 
charged with supervising the project included a suitable mix of specialty skills, spread 
among different missions. However, only one mission contained a specialist in 
decentralization (a decentralization lawyer).11 The teams that carried out the supervision 
missions generally included 1-3 World Bank staff from Washington or external 
consultants; the remaining members of the teams usually were drawn from West Africa 
resident missions, thus economizing on supervision costs. Government ministries and 
agencies participated in all supervision missions, and so, occasionally, did the co-
financier, AFD. Extensive aide-memoires recorded the main findings of the missions and 
provided adequate guidance to improve implementation performance. The MTR 
mission—carried out very late—generated a series of recommendations that among other 
things resulted in an attempt to revise some of the performance indicators.  
81. The performance ratings recorded in the Implementation Support Reports (ISRs) 
were originally lenient, reflecting the consensus view of the task team that time was 
needed to get this new type of project started.12 The ratings became stricter toward the 
end of the project, providing Bank management with more objective and more useful 
information needed to identify measures to improve project performance. Faced with 
evidence that performance was lagging, the supervison team can be credited with taking 
proactive measures to turn the project around, including convincing the Government to 
replace the underperforming project coordinator.  
82. A noteworthy deficiency in the supervision effort was the failure to resolve the 
weakness of the project’s M&E system. This weakness was evident from the inception of 
                                                          
11 Specialists from the Ministry of Decentralization participated in the implementation support missions. 
12 In 2006 and part of 2007, progress toward achievement of the PDO was rated unsatisfactory, but this 
did not reflect the actual performance of the Project. Following the cessation of Bank operations in 
Chad, management directed that the unsatisfactory rating be applied to all Bank projects in the country.   
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the project, when it emerged that no baseline survey had been carried out, and it was 
subsequently reinforced when it became clear that many of the performance indicators 
specified in the results framework were not being collected. While it is true that 
supervision teams regularly noted this problem in ISRs, no effective action was ever 
taken to resolve the problem and this situation complicated the ICR process. The M&E 
team was however able to speed-up and to provide most of the needed indicators with 
regard to the PDO. 
(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance 
Rating: Moderately satisfactory 
83. Based on the soundness of the project design, the adequation of the project 
objectives given the needs and potential of the country and its rural population, and the 
reasonably solid supervision effort (admittedly hampered by two interruptions of the 
Bank programs), the overall Bank performance is rated as moderately satisfactory. 
5.2  Borrower Performance 
(a) Government Performance 
Rating: Moderately satisfactory 
84. The Government made important contributions in the implementation of the 
project and showed its commitment to the project during the first phase. It had put in 
place strategies to reduce poverty (PRSP) and promote rural development (PIDR); and it 
prepared the project using its own personnel and consultants under the leadership of a 
special committee and high-level staff.  
85. During the project, the Government took the following actions:  
 Provided counterpart funds although below the agreed budgets throughout the 
project and continued to do so after the project’s closing date, thus keeping 
alive the possibility that the project objectives would be reached. 
 Required staff of the key ministries (the ministries dealing with land 
management, decentralization, and environment) to undergo project-financed 
training, and required the ministries to support the project’s field activities and 
participate in the multiagency teams supervising the project. 
 Promptly endorsed the recommendations of the supervision missions. 
 Changed the project management staff when the project leaders proved 
inadequate to attain the expected results.  
86. These positive contributions by the Government were however offset by a number 
of shortcomings in the support provided to the project by the Government.  
 Project effectiveness—essentially controlled by the Government--was delayed 
by six months due to delays in meeting the effectiveness conditions. 
 Throughout the life of the project, chronic delays in paying the annual 
counterpart funds and failure to contribute part of the committed funds made it 
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difficult to implement the disbursement categories where Government 
financing was needed.  
 At the end of the first phase, the ICR team work was complicated by delays in 
the preparation of the national completion report (transmitted on November 8, 
2010) and of the impact assessment (a preliminary draft was available only on 
November 29, 2010). 
 These difficulties highlight the complexity of Government processes for 
approval of procurement decisions and replenishment of funds. 
(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance 
Rating: Moderately satisfactory 
87. The main implementing agencies are the project implementation unit (including 
the national office and three regional offices), as well as the coordinating service 
providers. These agencies made a number of important contributions to successful 
implementation: 
 Establishment of the project management unit with new staff and field 
organization and recruitment of service providers before project effectiveness 
or soon thereafter.  
 Successful promotion and financing of an impressive number of project-
supported activities. Most of the burden was apparently carried by the regional 
offices and the supervising service provider, together with other service 
providers, and, as the final results show (Annexes 2 and 10), they did their 
work quite well.  
 Conscientious adherence to a major tenet of the project implementation 
strategy—popular participation and consultation with beneficiaries and 
stakeholders—and provision of the necessary training. 
 Carrying out of numerous studies that improved understanding of the 
complexities of rural development and implementation of CDD projects (see 
Annex 9)  
 Effective work, toward the end of the project, in achieving results on the 
ground and meeting the triggers for entering the second phase of the program.   
88. The performance of the implementing agencies was not without some problems, 
however, and the Government ICR strongly stressed their weaknesses. Areas in which 
their contribution could arguably have been better include the following: 
 Delays in the recruitment of (attributable partly to complex AFD and 
Government of Chad procurement regulations). 
 Weak quality control of the coordinating service provider and its 
subconsultants (local development NGOs) which were hired on a fixed rate 
basis. This choice led to a “cookie cutter” approach to the preparation of the 
Local Development Plans which affected their overall quality. 
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 Inadequate M&E system for impact evaluation, although basic records for 
management purposes were kept throughout the project (the M&E system 
improved toward the end). 
 Inadequate budget control regarding the linkages with annual and quarterly 
plans, inaccurate accounting and misplacement of cost items (into the 
management and M&E component), giving an appearance of excessive 
management costs.  
 Failure to ensure that NGOs and technical and engineering service providers 
were paid on time or at all.  
 
(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance 
Rating: Moderately satisfactory 
89. Taking into account the performance of the Government and the performance of 
the implementation agencies, Overall Borrower Performance is rated as Moderately 
satisfactory. The negative aspects observed in both are offset by the achievements that at 
the end were close to the targets set at midterm. The disbursement lag prevalent in the 
early project years was eliminated before the extended project period ended due to 
Borrower commitment.  
6.   Lessons Learned  
90. CDD approaches are challenging to implement. An important lesson emerging 
from PROADEL-1 is that bottom-up development projects that use CDD approaches are 
challenging to implement, because they require extensive support with respect to capacity 
building. Projects that use CDD approaches involve more actors and many more phases 
(e.g., sensitizing the target population, identifying and prioritizing community needs, 
formulating subprojects, managing the approval process, contracting with service 
providers, constructing facilities, transferring money, making payments, and properly 
maintaining constructed facilities). Implementing such projects is particularly challenging 
in rural areas, where public services and institutions are often limited or nonexistent and 
where poverty levels are daunting. This is the case of Chad where the long-standing 
centralized form of government posed an additional challenge.  
91. Participatory approaches create expectations that can be difficult to meet. To the 
extent that projects based on participatory CDD approaches succeed in mobilizing rural 
communities to articulate their development needs, they have a tendency to generate 
expectations that may be difficult to meet if significant amounts of financing cannot be 
mobilized. PROADEL-1 was able to respond to only a small proportion of the demand 
that was created: 5,840 local development assemblies were established under the Project, 
but only 405 subprojets were financed and completed. To avoid possible frustration, this 
reality should be kept in mind when subsequent phases of the Project are designed.  
92. Capacity of local communities to contribute co-financing may be limited. The 
Project design called for beneficiaries to contribute 10 percent of subproject costs, but 
beneficiaries were able to contribute only 3 percent on average, and a significant part of 
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their contributions was in kind (e.g., labor, local building materials). The lower than 
expected rate of co-financing reflects the extreme poverty prevailing throughout much of 
rural Chad, which constrains the ability of beneficiaries to mobilize resources for social 
infrastructure. The inability of many rural communities to contribute co-financing has 
important implications for the design of subsequent phases of the Project and suggests 
that there is a need to identify ways to lower the cost of subprojects, for example through 
innovative design.  
93. Capacity building is a long-term process. A consistent message heard from many 
stakeholders was the importance of continuing the capacity building activities that were 
launched during the first phase of the project. While the capacity building activities 
carried out under PROADEL-1 were extensive (see Annex 2.4), testimony from many 
stakeholders interviewed by the ICR mission as well as the Government ICR suggest that 
too often the emphasis was on meeting quantitative targets, and that the quality of the 
local development process often suffered. During subsequent phases of the Project, 
follow-up training will be needed to consolidate progress achieved in terms of building 
decentralized capacity and to further strengthen communities’ ownership of the local 
development process.  
94. CDD approaches can be used to empower vulnerable groups. PROADEL-1 
demonstrated that by encouraging vulnerable groups to participate actively in local 
decision-making processes, CDD approaches can effectively empower these groups, 
amplify their voices, and ultimately improve their status in society. PROADEL 
deliberately promoted participation by women and youth in needs identification 
exercises, for example by making sure that the three-person training teams (animateurs) 
always included at least one woman. This ensured that the needs and concerns of 
vulnerable groups received attention and ensured that the interests of these groups were 
adequately represented in the selection of subprojects to be funded. 
95. Project management and oversight functions should not be politicized. 
Implementation of PROADEL-1 was hampered at times by weaknesses in the Project 
management team resulting from the politicization of key staffing decisions, as well as by 
the overly interventionist stance of the Steering Committee. It goes without saying that 
selection of key staff must be nonpolitical and based strictly on merit. Chad disposes 
many experienced project managers and technical specialists, so if recruitment processes 
are conducted openly and transparently, it should be possible to recruit staff with the 
requisite skills and experience. Where skill gaps are identified, additional training on 
local development can be considered. Similarly, the role of the Steering Committee 
should be limited to review and approval of annual budgets, as well as providing 
guidance on key issues. The Steering Committee should not get involved in operational 
decisions, such as clearing the recruitment of staff.  
96. Results frameworks and M&E plans must be realistic given capacity constraints. 
The results framework and the associated M&E plan for PROADEL-1 turned out to be 
extremely ambitious given the limited capacity available for their implementation. The 
Project M&E manual called for the collection of far too much information, excessively 
frequent reporting, and the use of overly sophisticated analytical procedures. The data 
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needed to report on many performance indicators proved impossible to collect in a 
country the size of Chad, especially since some indicators had to be collected from 
hundreds of subprojects. In subsequent phases of the Project, it will be important to revise 
the M&E manual in light of what is possible, with the goal of restricting regular data 
collection activities to focus on information that is critical for project implementation and 
supervision. Performance indicators should not be limited to quantitative outputs but also 
include quality indicators related to ownership of the local development process, 
adequacy of LDPs with local conditions instead of more standardized documents, and 
effective management capacity of the subprojects.  
7.   Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing  
Agencies/Partners  
(a) Borrower/implementing agencies 
Comments from the Government (Ministry of Land Management, Urbanism and Habitat) 
were promised, but they were not received prior to the ICR filing deadline. 
(b) Cofinanciers 
No comments were received from the Agence Française de Développement. 
(c) Other partners and stakeholders  
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Annex 1:  Project Costs and Financing 
 
(a) Project Cost by Component  1/ 
Components 
Appraisal estimate, total
project costs 
(FCFA billions)    2/ 
Actual/Latest 
Estimate (FCFA 
billions) 
Percentage of 
Appraisal  
 
 FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO 
LOCAL DEVELOPMENT 
SUBPROJECTS 
 
7.60 8.55 113% 
 CAPACITY BUILDING FOR 
LOCAL DEVELOPMENT 
STAKEHOLDERS 
 
10.17 3.53 35% 
 SUPPORT FOR 
DECENTRALIZATION 
 
2.76 2.41 88% 
 MANAGEMENT AND 
INFORMATION SUPPORT 
 
4.52 5.37 119% 
  TOTAL PROJECT COSTS 25.05 19.86 79% 
 
      
 (b) World Bank Financing     
 
Bank financing; 
Appraisal Estimate 
(USD millions) 
Bank financing: 
Actual/Latest 
Estimate (USD 
millions)  3/ 
Bank 
financing: 
Percentage of 
Appraisal  
WORLD BANK FINANCING 23.00 25.54 111% 
Physical Contingencies                                           0.00 
                                      
0.00 
            
0.00 
Price Contingencies                                           0.00 
                                      
0.00 
            
0.00 
Total Bank financing  23.00 25.54  
Front-end fee PPF 0.00 0.00 .00 
Front-end fee IBRD 0.00 0.00 .00 
Total Bank Financing Required  23.00 25.54 111% 
Source: PROADEL Accounting Unit. 
1/ Project accounts have been kept only in FCFA, and an attempt to convert the amounts used for different 
components into dollars in retrospect would be inaccurate because of the varying exchange rates over the 
project period and because no records have been kept on the past exchange rates. However, as the latest 
estimate is based on actual accounting figures, the fourth column provides a good illustration of the 
percentages of funds planned and funds used for different components. 
2/ The dollar amounts in the PAD have been converted into FCFA by using the original exchange rate 5.31. 
Because of the dollar devaluation in relation to SDR (the grant currency), there still was US$200,000 
(0.8%) available for disbursement at the time of the ICR mission.  
3/ Actually disbursed amount (from the monthly report of the Bank’s Disbursement Department. 
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 (b) Financing   1/ 
Source of Funds Type of Cofinancing
Appraisal 
Estimate 
(FCFA 
billions) 
Actual/Latest 
Estimate 
(FCFA  
billions) 
Percentage of 
Appraisal 
 AFD  Parallel 3.00 2.29 76% 
 Government of Chad Counterpart 8.66 4.50 52 % 
 Local Communities Counterpart 0.86 0.28 32% 
 World Bank   Grant  
H 126 CH Grant 12.54 12.80 102% 
   TOTAL FINANCING  25.05 19.86 79% 
Source: PROADEL Accounting Unit. 
 
1/ The project accounts were kept only in FCFA. The contributions were provided in different currencies 
over the five-year period (AFD in Euros and FCFA; Government and local communities in FCFA; and 
World Bank in dollars, whose amount has depended on the changing exchange rate between SDR and 
dollar. Any presentation of all the financing in dollars would thus be inaccurate. (For the actual/latest 
estimate of the World Bank financing, a median exchange rate of 5.01 has been used. Because of exchange 
variations over time, the use of Bank fund in dollar terms and in FCFA terms is not the same.) 
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Annex 2:  Outputs by Component 
 
2.1: Targets and achievements for the “revised” performance indicators 
 
 
Impact indicators End target Achieved Achievement % of the end target 
Number of classrooms constructed and 
accessible during the entire school year 250 247 99% 
Percentage of households in the targeted 
communities having access to points of 
drinking water 
30% 20% 66% 
Percentage of completed subprojects  that 
are of satisfactory quality   80% 90% 111% 
Number of Local Development Plans 
adopted in the 11 departments of the 
“strong” intervention zone 
170 174 102% 
Number of infrastructures constructed and 
operational six months after completion 350 321 92% 
Result indicators    
Component 1: Support to local 
development subprojects    
Number of subprojects approved and 
completed by the targeted communities 370 341 92% 
Points of improved water supply in the 
rural zones served by the project 300 205 68% 
Health centers constructed, renovated or 
equipped 20 11 55% 
Number of classrooms constructed, 
renovated, and/or rehabilitated by the 
project 
250 247 99% 
Number of rural roads constructed or 
rehabilitated (km) -- -- -- 
Component 2: Capacity building for local 
development stakeholders
   
Training sessions of 
information/sensitization campaigns for 
local communities 
784 612 78% 
Number of local development assemblies 
(assemblées communautaires de 
développement) established 
4,800 5,215 114% 
Number of District Development Selection 
Committees (Cadre de concertation 
cantonal pour le développement--CCCD) 
established 
170 210 124% 
Number of Local Development Plans 
(PDL) adopted 170 174 102% 
Number of subproject management 
committees for collecting funds for 
maintenance 
370 312 84% 
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Component 3: Support for 
decentralization End target Achieved 
Achievement % of 
the end target 
Number of laws and decrees on 
decentralization prepared and adopted  75 53 71% 
Number of training sessions for staff of the 
central and decentralized administrations 1,000 1,577 158% 
Number of CLTO established 3 3 100% 
Component4:  
Management and M&E    
Number of M&E reports produced on time 28 25 89% 
Percentage of goods and service 
procurement done according to the 
approved procurement plan 
80% 80% 100% 
Financial management reports (RSF) 
prepared on time 20 11 55% 
Annual audits carried out on time and as 
unqualified 6 5 83% 
Source: Mission de revue à mi-parcours du PROADEL, June 2009, and data by the PROADEL 
Monitoring and Evaluation Unit 
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2.2:  Performance triggers monitored for entering into the second phase 
 
 
Triggers End target Achieved 
Achievement 
% of the end 
target 
Comments 
Trigger 1: 19 departments of 
47 will be covered by the 
project 
19 19 100%  
Trigger 2:50% of targeted 
communities have prepared 
and adopted their Local 
Development Plans in the 11 
southern "strong 
intervention" departments 
50% 99% 198% 
Because having a PDL is a condition for 
accessing PROADEL funds, all 176 
departments have prepared a PDL and 174 of 
them have been adopted 
Trigger 3:50% of these 
communities have at least one 
subproject whose first 
financing tranche has been 
disbursed 
50% 68% 136% 
100 of the 147 targeted communities have 
subprojects that have been or are being 
finished 
Trigger 4:75% of decision 
committees are in place in 
these 11 departments and 
have met at least once 
75% 91% 121% All departmental decision committees are in place, except one (in Dodjé in the South) 
Trigger 5:Decentralization 
regulatory texts have been 
enacted and adopted by the 
national assembly, 
12 6 50% 
In addition more than seven laws have been 
published and one more has been submitted 
to the National Assembly for adoption. But 
the already adopted laws allow organization 
of local elections after the census of the 
population being made 
Trigger 6:50% of the 
application texts projects are 
available 
50% 68% 124% 
47 decrees (of application of laws) of the 69 
projected by the Ministry of Decentralization 
are already available and allow organizing 
local elections 
Trigger 7:Timetable for 
administrative election 
(communes and 
communautés rurales ) has 
been defined 
-- -- -- 
A technical inter-ministerial committee has 
been established by the Prime Minister to 
accelerate the election process. The first 
elections will take place in June 2011 
Trigger 8:At least 0.5% of  
oil revenues devoted to 
priority sectors are disbursed 
for subprojects that come 
within the scope of Local 
Development Plans 
0.5% 0.2% 40% 
The monitoring system is not linked with the 
Government’s oil revenue records and the 
percentage of oil funds used for subprojects 
cannot be estimated. However, of the 
Government’s counterpart funds (that are 
mainly from oil revenue) about 40% is used 
for subprojects. 
Source: data by the PROADEL Monitoring and Evaluation Unit (as per 30 June 2010) 
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2.3.  Summary of Training Organized under PROADEL 
 
According to the records of the PROADEL M&E unit, the training organized for local 
capacity building included the following:  
 
 
Training for Indicator End target Achieved 
Achievement % 
of the end 
target 
1. Information and 
sensitization 
Number of 
sensitized persons  1,568,840 1,352,000 86% 
2. Local subproject 
procurement 
Number of trained 
persons 1,110 1,000 90% 
3. Environmental and social 
management 
Number of trained 
persons 1,215 954 79% 
4. Data collection Number of trained persons 60 60 100% 
5. Decentralization issues Number of trained persons 2,000 1,657 83% 
6. Project design and 
implementation 
Number of trained 
persons 80 60 75% 
7.  Project implementation 
management  
Number of trained 
persons 11,550 10,607 92% 
8. Accounting and financial 
management of subprojects 
Number of trained 
persons 11,550 10,607 92% 
9. Lobbying Number of trained persons 11,550 10,607 92% 
10. Subproject design and tender 
preparation 
Number of trained 
persons 70 50 71% 
Total number of trained 
persons13  16,085 14,388 89% 
Including youth, women and 
nomadic herders   3,850 3,536 92% 
 
 
The main capacity building efforts financed under Component 2 were directed to 
strengthening the technical and organizational capacity at the community level for 
participatory approaches, needs assessments, project management, and access to credit, or 
new poverty reduction behaviors. The component was to specifically target local 
communities and their associations, Subprefectoral and Departmental Decision and 
Approval Committees, and service providers (training institutions, NGOs, microfinance 
institutions). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13  The total number does not contain the people who have been sensitized on project operations. Because 
the same persons attended training in items 7, 8, and 9, they are counted only once. 
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Annex 3:  Economic and Financial Analysis 
 
 
Table 3.1:  Types and Costs of Subprojects 
Sector Type of subproject Subprojects % of total cost of subprojects 
Average cost 
(FCFA million) Number 14 % 
Education/health / communications     
 School buildings 102 25 42 33.8 
 Cultural / training / 
apprenticeship centers 
9 2 3 28.8 
 Community radios 3 1 1 27.7 
 Health centers 23 6 11 39.1 
 HIV/AIDS welcoming 
centers 
3 1 1 35.1 
    Subtotal 140 35 58  
Drinking water / sanitation     
 Deep wells 205 51 20 8.2 
 Mini-water towers 5 1 2 34.5 
 Sanitation 2 0.5 1 32.6 
Subtotal 212 53 23  
Economic infrastructures     
 Pastoral wells 33 8 12 28.9 
 Abattoirs/butcheries 4 1 2 5.9 
 Cattle markets 3 1 1 5.2 
 Storing depots 6 1 2 7.5 
 Vaccination parks 2 0.5 1 0.8 
 Ponds/pools 1 0.25 0.4 31.6 
    Subtotal 49 12 18  
GCE     
 Nurseries/reforestation 4 1 1 2.1 
Grand total 405 100 100  
 
 
Contribution by community: 10% for all other types of subprojects than deep wells 
(forage) and mini-water towers (mini-château d’eau), for which 3% and 5%, 
respectively. 
 
 
                                                          
14 Including 64 subprojects that are still under construction. 
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Annex 4:  Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes 
 
(a) Task team members 
 
Names Title Unit 
Responsibility/ 
Specialty 
Lending 
     
 
Supervision / ICR 
 Fatime Mahamat Adoum Executive Assistant AFMTD  
 Hugues Agossou Sr Auditor IADVP  
 Nicolas Ahouissoussi Senior Agriculture Economist ECSS1  
 Amadou Alassane Sr Agricultural Specialist AFTAR  
 Andrew Osei Asibey Sr Monitoring & Evaluation Specialist AFTRL  
 Mohammed A. Bekhechi Lead Counsel LEGEN  
 Ningayo Charles Donang Senior Procurement Specialist AFTPC  
 Lancine Dosso Financial Management Specialist AFTFM  
 Emile Louis Rene Finateu Consultant AFTFM  
 Soulemane Fofana Operations Officer AFTAR  
 Anna Victoria Gyllerup Senior Operations Officer AFTRL  
 Sekou Keita E T Consultant AFTFM  
 Remi Kini Sr Environmental Economist ENV  
 Lucienne M. M'Baipor Social Development Specialist AFTCS  
 Pierre Morin Senior Procurement Specialist AFTPC  
 Etienne NKoa Sr Financial Management Specialist AFTFM  
 Africa Eshogba Olojoba Sr Environmental Specialist AFTEN  
 Korotimi Sylvie Traore Program Assistant MNACS  
 Paulette C.E. Aida Thioun Zoua Program Assistant AFMTD  
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(b) Staff time and cost 
 
Stage of Project Cycle 
Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) 
No. of staff weeks USD Thousands (including travel and consultant costs) 
Lending   
 FY00 14 67.25 
 FY01 29 108.96 
 FY02 41 163.12 
 FY03 30 110.59 
 FY04 24 81.19 
 FY05 16 43.08 
 FY06  0.00 
 FY07  0.00 
 FY08  0.00 
 
Total: 154 574.19 
Supervision/ICR   
 FY00  0.00 
 FY01  0.00 
 FY02  0.10 
 FY03  0.00 
 FY04  0.00 
 FY05 22 92.02 
 FY06 32 88.39 
 FY07 36 131.45 
 FY08 24 72.04 
 FY09 6 0.00 
 
Total: 120 384.00 
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Annex 5:  Beneficiary Survey Results 
 
1. Limited beneficiary survey 
1. No beneficiary survey was carried out during the project period, neither after the 
completion of the project. However, the ICR mission interviewed close to 100 
beneficiaries during the field visits. The interviewees included subproject members, 
different levels of project committees, and local administrations (altogether 17 meetings). 
The following summarizes the outcomes of this “mini-survey.”  
 
2. The methodology was based on an open approach, allowing the discussants to 
present their opinions freely, but at the same time aiming at getting them to answers 
questions about the approach used, the importance of the financial and technical support 
given, problems encountered, social issues such as the gender situation, and the future 
needs of the community. 
 
3. This mini-survey is not considered to represent all the project areas because the 
sample was small and the survey concentrated on two of the three project regions 
(Moundou and N’Djamena), N’Djamena being the one where the activities started last, 
only about two years ago. 
 
2. Approach used for implementation of subprojects 
4. The members of the communities had become familiar with the community-
driven development (CDD) approach or at least had heard of it under other programs or 
from the neighboring communities. Thus they were receptive to getting the information 
agents (“animateurs”)15 to visit their villages and organize meetings for the members of 
the community. In all cases except one, these animation groups were the source that 
brought the first news about the details of the PROADEL program and the opportunities 
it offered. In one village, some 10 km away from the main roads, younger people who 
had traveled further, were the first source of information about the forthcoming 
PROADEL, and in that village the preliminary subproject plans were waiting for the 
animators when they came. The animators also helped the villages, village groups and 
quarters in towns to form development committees (Assemblée communataire de 
développement—ACD) and to prepare local development plans.  
 
5. The ACDs were responsible for managing the implementation of the subprojects, 
including making contracts and taking care of the payments.16 For formulating the 
technical documents for subprojects and preparation of the financing requests and 
procurement documents the ACDs recruited technical service providers (Cabinets 
                                                          
15 NGOs recruited by the Coordinating Service Provider (“Opérateur Ensemblier”) to be the trainers and 
advisors to villages and to assist them in organizing the village planning meetings, preparing Local 
Development Plans, and prioritizing the order of the subprojects to be financed.  
16 These procedures were according to the Project Operations Manual of 2002, which was essentially 
based on the World Bank 1978 document “Guidelines for simplified community-based procurement 
and disbursement.”  
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d’ingénieurs conseils), and for construction and equipping the subproject facilities they 
contracted engineering enterprises.  
 
6. All the subproject beneficiaries were satisfied with the help they had received 
from the animators and technical service providers. They were equally satisfied with the 
structures built by the engineering firms, but pointed out that there had been a few 
problems especially with deep wells that in a couple of cases had not reached the aquifer 
level or after a while had not produced as much water as expected. However, in most 
cases the engineering firms had made the necessary improvements within the guarantee 
period. (During the ICR mission an ACD committee pointed out a crack in a wall of one 
grain store and the engineer accompanying the mission promised that it will be repaired.) 
 
7. The villagers highly appreciated the information, training, and technical 
assistance they had received through the project. The ACDs were now confident that they 
know the procedures well enough to be able to manage subproject implementation the 
next time without any outside assistance except for design of the structures, for which 
they would need to recruit technical service providers. In the discussions with the ICR 
team, it appeared that the villagers who had participated in training organized by the 
animators had internalized the principal elements of the procedures. As a result, there 
seemed to be a new sense of social dynamism among the villagers. (This self-
containment view was contradicted by the all service provider, that is, both the animating 
NGOs and technical service providers and well as the Bank’s procurement specialist—
see Annex 6 on Stakeholders’ views).  
 
3. Benefits of the subprojects 
8. The beneficiaries had retained well information about the benefits of the different 
types of subprojects, indicating that the animators and village meetings had served the 
intended purpose. For instance, for the deep wells (“forages”) they were able to list the 
following benefits: 
- Now clean drinking water was available close by, both saving time for women 
who had earlier to fetch water from a distance;  
- Villagers (and people of neighboring villages) were now able to enter 
productive activities that require water (small-scale gardening and establishing 
nurseries);  
- Other economic benefits such as increased the number of cattle and watering 
trees had become possible; and  
- Clean water allowed maintaining better health.   
 
9. As another example, the beneficiaries mentioned benefits of schools, such as:  
- Improved literary rates;  
- Better teaching facilities (earlier the schools were held under big trees without 
tables and fixed blackboards);  
- Increasing the number of students. New schools appealed better to parents so 
that they would send their daughters to school. For instance in Bokora, in the 
semi-desert town 270 km northeast from the capital, the school enrolment in 
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five classes (three of them built by project financing) was 285 students, and 
105 of them were girls (37 percent).  
 
10. The beneficiaries also understood the necessity for maintenance of the constructed 
facilities. In all subprojects visited, the ACD committee collected small fees from the 
users for maintenance purposes. For instance in a subproject of a mini-water tower in 
Mayaguine Canton the money collected was FCFA 175,000 (equivalent of US$365, but 
with much higher purchasing power) by charging FCFA 100 (US$0.21) for each 200 
liters of water. At the new school in Bokoro the parents-students association collected 
FCFA 1,000 (US$2.20) per year for a male student and FCFA 500 (US$1.10) for a girl to 
help in maintenance and small education needs. (Primary education is otherwise free in 
Chad.) 
 
11. An important benefit mentioned by the villagers was that the local development 
plans (LDP—Plans de développement local) could also be used for getting funds from 
other sources than PROADEL for subprojects that could not be financed under this 
project. 
 
4.  Gender and youth 
12. The original Project Development Objective stated that “particular attention will 
be paid on women, youth and marginalized groups.” 17Among the 405 subprojects 
financed under the project, only two are women-owned (Centres de couture) and all the 
rest are “mixed,” that is, contain both men and women as members and beneficiaries. 
However, PROADEL has been instrumental in promoting women and improving their 
status in the communities where the project is active. In project committees at all levels 
there are women members, and the ICR mission noted that in all ACDs for village groups 
and subprojects there are one or two women members. As for the youth, they are even 
better represented in the ACDs, because in the subprojects that the ICR team visited, 
there were present 2 to 3 youths. The ICR mission did observe that other 
underrepresented groups, such transhumant herders were not included in the same 
manner in ACDs, which would also have been more complicated due to their transient 
way of life. However, the LDPs included land management sections that provided them 
and their cattle with safe corridors and sometimes even cattle well (in Bokoro). 
 
13. The positive development in this respect was caused apparently by two facts: (a) 
every three-member animation team organized by project-financed NGOs and going to 
the field contained one woman; and (b) they presented in the villages the project 
objective for underprivileged sections of the population and possibly in the manner that 
involvement of women and youth was a premise for getting financing for subprojects.  
 
14. The mission’s visits were at the daytime, and although the beneficiaries reported 
the involvement of women and youth with obvious contentment, no women attended the 
                                                          
17 The various marginalized groups are listed in Lutte contre la marginalisation prepared by the Opérateur 
ensemblier), November 2006. (See listing in Annex).  
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meetings of the ICR mission at subproject sites or with the different levels of committees. 
(Women and girls were told to be “in the houses or in the fields”.) There were several 
young men present at each subproject site.  
 
5.  Problems encountered 
15. In the first instance of interviews, the members of subprojects said that there had 
been no problems. However, when discussing the topic further, some problems that had 
been encountered emerged, such as: 
 
- At the ACD level (usually covering several villages) there were more priority 
subproject ideas than was possible to implement (even in the most active 
ACDs not more than three subprojects were allowed under the first phase of 
the program). Also, because most of the ACDs contained several villages, 
some dissatisfaction had arisen among the villages because of the place 
selected for the subproject was not in their village; 
- There had been far too many subprojects for the cantonal CCCDs (Cadre 
cantonal de concertation pour le développement) to consider and some 
villages had to be left out or made to use temporality the facilities built in 
nearby villages; 
- The utilization level of grain storage facilities built (usually 300 tons) were 
severely underutilized during the first year, bringing very little income to the 
respective subproject committees. They had, however, plans to carry out 
information campaigns in neighboring villages to improve the use of 
utilization levels; 
- Some village groups that had received the first training by animators had not 
received no other assistance and no subprojects. In these cases the problem 
apparently was in lacking initiatives among the villagers, because the 
neighboring village groups could have had more than one subproject at the 
same time; 
- Some deep wells had not produced the water promised and the engineering 
firms had to come back to increase the depth of the wells (and at least in one 
case the well site was abandoned); 
- Signing of the contract between PROADEL and the ACDs had to take place at 
the regional office of the project, sometimes 200-300 km away, which was 
considered expensive and difficult for the ACD committees; 
- An account had to be opened in a bank for the cash deposit required for 
approval of a subproject, and sometimes the nearest bank can be more than 
200 km away (as in Bokoro). 
 
16. Supervision reports and the mid-term report of PROADEL have indicated that 
contribution of 10 percent of the investment by the beneficiaries was seen too high (the 
same is also implied by the fact that the total financing by beneficiaries was below the 
PAD estimates). The ACDs or review and approval committees that the ICR mission met 
at different levels did not consider the contribution level as an obstacle as such, especially 
as part of the contribution could be in kind (land, materials, labor). An obstacle in this 
respect was that the villagers had been given to understand (by politicians?) that 
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everything would be free because the country now had oil revenue. In addition, there had 
been some misunderstanding about the nature of the in-kind contributions and their 
valuation, because they were not mentioned in the contracts.  
 
17. Also, the villagers did not consider it a problem that the implementation period 
for a subproject commonly extended to one to two years from animation to reception of 
the facility. The ICR mission concluded that their expectations in this respect were not 
very high. 
 
6. Future needs 
18. As already indicated, the demand for subprojects has been much large that the 
funds available have allowed to finance. For instance, the number of subproject 
documents prepared for the consideration of the sous-prefectoral committee of 
Mayaguine Canton, subprojects was 36, of which only 26 were possible to finance. In the 
same canton, there are 45 villages and only seven wells.  
 
19. The visited ACDs mentioned their future priorities of subprojects to include, in a 
varying order in different communities: 
 
- School buildings to replace the Ecoles saccos (under trees); 
- Canteens and fencing for schools 
- Health centers; 
- Grain stores; 
- Deep wells and wells for animal herders; mini-water towers 
- Mosques; 
- Vehicles to transport grain sacks and village needs; 
- Culture or sport centers for the youth; 
- Animal vaccination centers; and 
- Transit corridors for cattle. 
 
20. An apparent need, but not mentioned by the current beneficiaries, would be find a 
solution to the drudgery of grinding grains, which affect in particular women and girls. In 
the neighboring countries some groups have obtained flour mills under the projects 
financed by the World Bank, and although many of these mills have not worked well or 
have broken down, with the fee collection, maintenance and bookkeeping culture already 
established in Chad they would have a good chance to be successful.  
 
21. At appraisal, feeder roads had been believed to become one of the priorities. 
However, none of them was as high in the priority list as several other needs and had not 
been financed under this phase of the program.  
 
7. Observations on local governance 
22. The project authorities that the ICR mission met at the local level (representatives 
of traditional authority, cantonal, sub-prefectural and departmental levels) confirmed that 
the project had been very important for development of their areas (commonly saying 
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that “without PROADEL we would have nothing at all of the type of subprojects we now 
have). Also, they confirmed that they had received training to carry out their activities for 
the project, but also emphasized that more is needed, for instance for procurement. As for 
future needs, they mentioned essentially the same types of subprojects, but in addition the 
mayor of Bokora (member of the departmental approval committee) brought up the need 
to improve the leisure facilities such as parks with more trees. 
 
23. The civic authorities were not as satisfied with the competencies at the subproject 
level as the ACD committees, mentioning problems of procurement and lack of adequate 
capacity among the engineering enterprises.  
 
24. As for decentralization, the governmental and elected authorities emphasized the 
importance of PROADEL  not only for having helped in developing the legislation, but 
also as facilitator of training of civil servants and elected bodies and as provider of a 
variety of equipment for offices, including computers. They also suggested that more 
training would be needed at all levels of decentralization, possibly in form of well-
planned workshops or seminars, to ensure the consolidation of the decentralization steps 
taken. However, they were confident that they will successful manage the sub-
departmental elections planned for April-June 2011. 
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Annex 6:  Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results 
 
1. Stakeholder workshops 
1. The ICR mission met with key stakeholder representatives in individual or small 
group sessions. The stakeholders met included the following:  
 
(i) the Secretary General and other senior officials of the Ministry of Land 
Management, Urbanism and Habitat, which is the supervising ministry for 
the project and which chairs the Steering Committee,  
(ii) the Secretaries General and other senior officials of the line ministries that 
were directly involved with the project (i.e., the Ministries of Planning and 
Economy, Decentralization, and Environment);  
(iii) the Coordinator of the Cellule Permanente de Suivi that is in charge of 
monitoring of all externally financed projects; 
(iv) PROADEL management and senior staff;  
(v) Staff of PROADEL Regional Coordination Units;  
(vi) Private sector operators, that is, NGOs pour animation and prestataires de 
service (technical advisory agencies and engineering firms), which have 
assisted in implementing subprojects);  
(vii) The development partners those are most active in rural development in 
Chad (AFD, EU, GTZ, and the World Bank). 
 
2. Methodology 
2. Stakeholders were asked the following key questions: 
 
 What was the relationship of your ministry/agency/organization vis-à-vis the 
project? In other words, how did your ministry/agency/organization engage 
with the project?  
 What were the most significant results/achievements of the project? 
 What were the main problems encountered that negatively affected 
implementation of the project? 
 What are the most important lessons learned from the project and its 
implementation that can help to inform the design of a follow-on project in 
Chad, or similar projects in other countries? 
3. Main achievements  
3. All of the stakeholders interviewed expressed appreciation for the achievements 
of the project, a couple of the Government representatives even saying that “this is the 
best project we have had.” They strongly endorsed the general approach of the project, 
i.e., decentralization of service provision and administrative structures and bringing 
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development finance to the local level and helping rural communities to decide on their 
priorities in a participatory manner. They also emphasized that for the participatory 
approach to be effective, it needs to be provided with even more of information, training, 
and technical support.  
 
4. In their own work and organizations they attributed several results to the project. 
As a summary, the public- and private-sector partners reported that the project had: 
 
 Despite a slow start (the activities really started in January 2006), the project 
succeeded in achieving its main goals in terms of subprojects, as 428 
subprojects have been planned on the basis participative and local 
development approach, 405 of them have been financed, 341 completed, and 
the rest are under work. Altogether 174 cantonal Local Development Plans 
have been prepared, and they cover the key project areas, each including 
several cantons, and including hundreds more of potential subprojects.  
 Awareness of PROADEL facilities have been spread to a large number of 
villages, where it trained and helped organize as many as 5,840 villages to 
participate in local development groups (Assemblée communautaire de 
développement). All this is an important step for making the local population 
responsible for their own development (“changement de mentalite”), 
participating in the selection of their own priorities, and giving them a certain 
degree of autonomy. (There also was an opinion that the local people do not 
still feel fully responsible for their subprojects.) The demand of subprojects is 
now estimated to be in thousands. 
 Because the project was among the first in the field of decentralization and 
also in some areas in community-driven development, it initially served as a 
pilot program and developed approaches and methodologies that facilitating 
more extensive efforts to come. 
 The basic procedures, from the decisions of priorities in the villages to 
formulating and implementing subprojects, have now been developed and 
tried out, and they provide a basis for a countrywide approach if finances so 
allow. The project also allowed correcting the earlier expectations of the local 
people that they did not need to make their own contribution to get new 
facilities and services. 
 Through linking with and partial financing of the Volet Gestion 
Communautaire des Ecosystems project, PROADEL ensured environmental 
protection and improvement activities, reforestation schemes, and 
enforcement of environmental standards relating to infrastructures. 
 The project combined the necessary decentralization effort that the 
Government had promoted since the previous decade and the community 
development approach to the fight against the poverty in Chad. The 
decentralization is needed for the country as the basis of long-term 
development, but, in addition, local development requires local initiative, 
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skills, investments, and involving of all population there through a 
participatory approach. 
 The decentralization effort has advanced on the legislative side as most of the 
key laws and regulations have been drafted with the help of PROADEL 
financing and largely approved, providing a basis for organizing local 
administrations (some laws and regulations are still pending) and preparations 
for local elections at the subprefecture level. The project also acquired or 
facilitated acquiring of information technology and materials for the 
departmental administrations. As preparation for the local elections, 
PROADEL has helped to finance the defining the arears and borders of 200 
communes.   
 The project facilitated organization of workshops, seminars, and conferences 
for training for capacity buildings among the local populations, the 
participating agencies and NGOs, and the Government administration at the 
national, regional and departmental levels. 
 In the departments, the officials appreciated that project had allowed an 
increase in the coverage of wells (the demand for more is still great), 
facilitating potable water to thousands of people, as well as building of new 
schools and health centers. 
 The private technical service provider and engineering firms were particularly 
satisfied with new contract opportunities that the LDPs brought up, and while 
not always making profit, PROADEL gave opportunities to expand their 
sphere of work and employment opportunities for their staff and workers, and, 
as partners of a World Bank-financed project, important exposure and 
contacts in the country. 
 For these firms a major achievement was that they were able to complete 341 
of the 405 subprojects started despite the various delays and payment 
problems they encountered (see the next section about problems). Also the 
rest are expected to be completed within next few months. 
 The project also helped substantially in establishing offices for land 
management (Observatoire de Foncier), land recording, and training in land-
management aspects. 
 Despite the communications and other problems between the four project 
offices, project finances have been recorded properly (after numerous 
corrections), annual accounts have been audited by qualified auditors, and 
audits have been unqualified. Project monitoring and evaluation arrangements 
have improved, the M&E unit has prepared detailed annual plans, and during 
the last two years—after the mid-term review--the projects M&E reporting 
has become satisfactory. 
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4. Problem areas and difficulties 
5. Stakeholders also recognized that a number of problems had arisen during 
implementation of PROADEL and that they should be avoided in any eventual follow-on 
operation: 
 Because of a very slow start of the project (blamed on inefficient 
management), the supervising ministry and the World Bank implementation 
support missions became very much involved in project management and 
implementation. Most views were that this involvement probably saved the 
project (200 subprojects were processed and implemented in the last less than 
two years. However, there also was a contrary view among the stakeholders 
according to which the Government and the World Bank should maintain an 
advisory and oversight role and not start “running the projects” (“il faut 
responsabiliser l’équipe”).  
 When dismissing a project management team, it always takes months for the 
new team to catch up the working level of the previous team. In the case of 
PROADEL, after removing the original project management teams after mid-
term, there still were two more changes in top management because of 
resignations or staff transfers.  
 The World Bank teams did not work enough with the Cellule Permanente de 
Suivi (however, they visited this unit during missions). Also, the gap between 
World Bank projects (in this case between the phases) is harmful for effective 
implementation of the program. 
 Training at the field level of ACDs and various project committees was 
inadequate to make them really familiar with their duties partly because the 
project represented a piloting exercise and also because there was a rush 
during the last two years of the project to catch up with the indicator targets. 
(Most stakeholders mentioned procurement problems and that the capacity of 
service providers was often not adequate.) Also, under the decentralization 
component more training would be needed. 
 When the international coordinating service provider (Opérateur Ensemblier) 
left at the end of their contract in early 2010, the activities seemed to stop in 
many areas in the field.  
 Delays in the disbursement of government counterpart funding resulted in 
frequent disruptions to the project implementation schedule, delaying the 
timely implementation many field activities. However, when the project ended 
in June 2010, the Government continued to supply funds, thus facilitating 
completion of subprojects that had been financed during the project period. 
(At the time of the ICR mission, 65 subprojects had not been finished.)  
 The quantity and sometimes the quality of technical assistance provided to the 
project by the service providers (technical engineers and contractors) were 
sometimes inadequate, especially the technical assistance relating to 
management of water resources. A reason for this problem was the far-away 
location of many subprojects where the service providers were able to employ 
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only engineers just out of school (but where they gained experience necessary 
for their trade.) On the other hand, because no consideration had been given in 
the contracts for differing physical conditions (especially the distance to the 
work area) and population readiness for starting a subproject, NGOs and other 
service providers had to accept contracts that they knew were not profitable 
for them. 
 The cost projections during project preparation and at appraisal were 
unrealistic, resulting in consistent underestimation of subproject costs. As a 
result, the projected numbers of subprojects to be financed was too large, and 
more subprojects were planned than could eventually be financed. (This 
situation was partly corrected at mid-term, when it was better known what 
type of subprojects the population wanted and what were their costs; at 
appraisal the types of priority subprojects could not be more than “educated 
guesses.”) 
 Implementation of many subprojects was delayed by late payments to 
contractors (entrepreneurs) and other service providers (irregularité de 
financement des microprojets). Many technical service providers and 
contractors had to wait for 6 to 12 months for their payments, or even longer.  
 Service providers also experienced socio-economic difficulties and difficulties 
in getting consensus when an ACD sometimes comprised as many as 10 
villages of different sizes and should have included besides local pastoralists, 
also transhumant herders and other underprivileged groups.  
 The flow of funds was slow at all levels. Replenishments requests addressed 
to the World Bank took longer time than necessary, even though the Financial 
Monitoring System was supposed to speed up disbursements. The 
Government’s counterpart contributions were late. Transactions between the 
central PMU and the regional LPMUs and subprojects also frequently took 
weeks or even months, usually because the needed supporting documents had 
not been provided. The lack of financial institutions outside major cities is 
also a factor that slows down the money flow. Also, there was nobody guiding 
ACDs in the payment issues, and they made errors (this task was not in the 
TOR of either the animators or technical advisory agencies.) 
 The contributions required from local communities were too high because of 
the general poverty, especially in the more remote areas where cash economy 
is not very common and among the marginalized groups. This situation led in 
a few cases to abandoning of the subproject. Also, it appeared that at least in 
the N’Djamena region, the Government (politicians) had indicated that the 
population did not need to provide any contribution, but everything was free. 
 When it took a long time to implement a subproject, the prices of materials 
increased and caused financial problems, even losses to service providers. 
Also, the service providers ran out of funds as no refinancing was provided for 
their services. 
 The whole decentralization activity has been slow and resources limited. 
 49 
 
 In principle, decentralization should cover the whole country; it is difficult 
politically to explain to people in left-out provinces and departments why their 
turn would come later, although economically it seems reasonable. There also 
was lack of written material for local administration (GTZ/Government 
collected the decentralization laws and regulations into one book to be 
distributed to new counselors, but this book may need to be updated.) 
 There is no juridical status for the Local Development Plans and ACDs that 
could be used in potential disputes. 
 For the Observatoire foncier the process of funding has been slow, as it had 
first to refinance the activities from its own budget and then get the eligible 
items refunded from the project (there was no convention). This unit would 
have liked more flexibility in using the funds. Also, the students under this 
university-run unit suffered from financial problems and would have needed 
scholarships. 
5. Lessons learned  
6. Based on the positive achievements of the project but also in recognition of the 
problem areas and difficulties, stakeholders identified lessons learned in a number of 
areas. 
 
Project management. 18 
 
 An experienced project management team is very important for the start and 
eventual success of the project. Selection of the key staff must be non-political 
and strictly based on merit. Academic qualifications are not an adequate basis, 
and as Chad already possess experienced project managers and other senior 
project staff, only those with earlier experience in similar assignments and 
proven initiative should be chosen for so important and innovative projects as 
those supporting decentralization and local, participative development. 
 Monitoring and evaluation manuals are often asking too much information 
and also asking for it on regular, usually quarterly basis. Much of such 
information is not possible to collect in such a large country as Chad and from 
hundreds of subprojects or governmental units. In M&E manuals and PADs it 
would be important to concentrate “on the possible” and on information and 
data that are critical for project implementation. For more general impact 
oriented indicators, special studies should be carried out, for instance, every 
two years.  
Project design 
 The project design for local development was relatively simple and the 
participatory approach had been at least partially experimented under ASPOP 
                                                          
18  Problems with project management and management of human resources was mentioned by nearly all 
the stakeholders 
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and bilateral field programs. However, PROADEL was still correctly started 
in one region, and then annually extended to two more regions, because it was 
known that project’s field work would be challenged by the limited 
implementation capacity.  
 The projects can be designed in such a way (for instance in phasing their 
implementation) that not many preconditions are needed. (An opinion: Le 
PROADEL était le premier projet au Chad sans ces conditions). 
 The contracts for subprojects, while providing guidance for their contents and 
costs, should also allow taking into account the different geographical and 
other conditions (for instance allowing inclusion of transport and additional 
material costs for far-away locations). Also, a guarantee fund or payment 
system should be developed for the case that ACD committees abandon their 
subproject or misuse the allocated funds. The loss should not be on the service 
providers who have done their work properly.  
Capacity building 
 Although more training would have been needed and the training should be 
provided before entering into the cycle of subprojects, local communities 
benefited from the training and capacity building facilitated by the project. 
This empowered them to become organized, identify development priorities in 
their own communities, prepare development plans, and prepare and 
implement subprojects identified in the development plans. Training was also 
beneficially for the Ministry of Decentralization and other ministries involved 
in the project, as well for the local governmental administrations in the project 
regions. 
 Training of ACD committees should continue after the subproject has been 
implemented (for instance to secure the committee’s financial competence and 
maintenance of the facilities). 
 At the start of a project such as PROADEL, there may not be many competent 
service providers. Adequate training and guidance for the new aspirants may 
be needed. 
Financial management of the project 
 Interruptions of disbursements by the World Bank slow down implementation 
progress, increase costs (because activities must be repeated), and compress 
the implementation time line. Therefore with projects such as PROADEL, the 
World Bank should be favorably disposed to grant extension requests (as it 
did in the case of PROADEL by extending the project period by a year.  
 Late payment and non-payment of service providers was a chronic problem. 
Measures must be found to ensure that in future contractual conditions and 
payment schedules will be respected by the project and especially by project 
beneficiaries in charge of implementing subprojects. The engineering firms 
and other service providers must be paid in timely fashion. One option would 
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be to involve the technical service providers (Conseiller technique) in 
supervising the payments to be made by ACDs committees.  
 With the objective of ensuring equitable treatment for all service providers, 
PROADEL (like its agricultural-sector sister project ASPOP) introduced a 
standardized country-wide payment system for the preparation and 
implementation of subprojects. This turned out to be unfair, because the cost 
structure differed significantly in different parts of the country.  
 Shocks stemming from global economic downturns, dramatic and 
unanticipated changes in the exchange rate, suspensions of World Bank 
lending programs for political or other reasons, and other external factors 
often affect the amount of money available for the project purposes. In the 
case of PROADEL, it allowed more dollars to be disbursed (because of the 
rising rate of SDR), thus partially balancing the devaluation of dollar in 
relation to FCFA (from 1 dollar giving originally FCFA 535 and finally FCFA 
475).  
 Many local ACDs that awarded contracts for project-supported subprojects 
were initially unfamiliar with simplified competitive bidding procedures such 
as those required for selection of service providers. Training in this respect 
improved the situation but not sufficiently, and more consolidation training 
will be needed in this respect even in the Phase I project areas. Although 
introduction of the competitive bidding procedures may have delayed the 
initiation of field work, use of the approved procedures enabled ACD 
committees in most cases to choose the best and least expensive NGOs and 
other service providers to carry out the field activities.  
 Decentralization is a complex, costly, and long-term program, and it should be 
given more time to be implemented. (Some bilaterals had given conditions for 
their participation that elections must be made at the certain date.)   
Donor coordination and harmonization 
 PROADEL, together with agricultural-sector sister project ASPOP, has played 
an influential role in Chad in introducing a new approach to the fight against 
the poverty, one that has been successfully integrated into the Government’s 
strategic planning and decentralization effort. It has mobilized the 
Government and donors that are active in the rural development field to 
coordinate better around a common set of decentralized, participatory 
approaches  
 The few international financing agencies and bilaterals active in the local 
development field have worked in a relatively good harmony and aimed at 
learning from each other (for instance by participating in a GTZ-financed 
workshop). Currently, when the European Union is planning its second 
tranche of local assistance, it is basing the approach very much on the similar 
lines with PRODEL.  
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Annex 7:  Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR 
 
7.1.  Summary and Conclusions of Government’s ICR 
 
RÉSUMÉ DU NIVEAU D’EXECUTION ET D’ATTEINTE DES OBJECTIFS DU PROADEL19 
 
1. Le Projet d'Appui au Développement Local (PROADEL) a pour objectif global de 
promouvoir le développement local et la décentralisation par l’amélioration de l’accès 
des populations aux services sociaux de base notamment la santé, l’éducation, 
l’alimentation en eau potable et à l’utilisation rationnelle des ressources naturelles grâce 
au renforcement des capacités des communautés en matière d’organisation, de 
planification, d’exécution des activités issues des priorités de leurs plans de 
développement. Il vise également à permettre aux communautés locales de certains 
écosystèmes fragiles du Tchad de mieux combattre la déforestation et la dégradation des 
terres et mieux gérer les aires protégées.  
 
2. Du fait de son ambition de s'attaquer à la situation de pauvreté des populations et 
de soutenir le processus de décentralisation, le PROADEL s’inscrit dans un Projet à long 
termes. C’est pourquoi, l'instrument APL (Adaptable Program Loan) a été choisi afin de 
disposer d'un horizon flexible qui permet d'atteindre les objectifs. 
 
3. La première phase du PROADEL, conduite de 2004 à 2010 poursuivait deux 
objectifs de développement à savoir i) accroître l’accès aux services d’infrastructures de 
base dans des communautés pauvres ciblées et améliorer la capacité locale des 
institutions et communautés à gérer le processus de développement et ii) permettre aux 
communautés locales de certains écosystèmes fragiles du Tchad de mieux combattre la 
déforestation et la dégradation des terres et mieux gérer les aires protégées.  
 
4. Cette première phase a été financée par l'Association pour le Développement 
International (IDA), l’Agence Française de Développement (AFD), l’Etat du Tchad et les 
populations bénéficiaires pour un montant total de 46 millions de dollars US.  
 
5. La stratégie d’intervention a été basée sur trois principes fondamentaux qui sont i) 
une démarche participative avec des interventions multisectorielles émanant des besoins 
exprimés par les communautés, ii) le renforcement des capacités des communautés pour 
fixer des priorités, planifier le développement au niveau locale, mettre en œuvre des 
microprojets et iii) un partenariat avec diverses institutions de l’Etat, le secteur privé et 
les ONG. 
 
6. Le PROADEL a mis en place et a apporté son appui aux Assemblées 
Communautaires de Développement (ACD) et aux Cadres Cantonaux de Concertation 
pour le Développement (CCCD) répartis dans 19 départements du pays. De manière 
générale, la zone d’intervention compte environ 2 600 000 habitants soit 25 % de la 
population du Tchad. 
                                                          
19  In Rapport d’achèvement. Rapport final, octobre 2010, pp. 7-16. 
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7. Au terme de cinq années d’exécution effective de ses activités, la première phase 
du PROADEL a enregistré des résultats perceptibles sur le terrain. Ces résultats sont 
présentés ci-après selon une démarche qui nous indique quel a été le niveau des fonds 
mobilisés, pour quelles réalisations physiques et pour quels effets observés sur les 
bénéficiaires.  Les résumés de ces résultats sont présentés à travers cinq parties qui sont: 
 
(i)  les niveaux des effets observés par les bénéficiaires ; 
(ii)  les niveaux de performance sur la base des indicateurs de performance et 
déclencheursde phase ; 
(iii) les niveaux des réalisations physiques ; 
(iv) les niveaux de décaissement des ressources financières ; 
(v) Principales contraintes rencontrées dans l’exécution de la première phase 
(vi) Recommandations à prendre en compte dans la deuxième phase du projet 
 
1. Les niveaux des effets observés par les bénéficiaires au cours de la première 
phase. 
 
8. Les investigations menées sur la base des rapports internes (Suivi et évaluation), 
externes (Aides mémoires des missions de supervision, rapports d’audit) et les rencontres 
des différents acteurs au niveau central et au niveau du terrain ont permis de mettre en 
relief les principaux résultats observés par les bénéficiaires. Ces résultats démontrent que 
le PROADEL a eu des effets globalement acceptables malgré les différents évènements 
qui y ont pesé négativement dont notamment: 
- le retard de 8 mois pour l’approbation du marché de l’Opérateur Ensemblier 
chargé de préparer les communautés à l’élaboration des Plans de 
Développement Local (PDL) où sont identifiés les microprojets à financer;  
- la suspension des décaissements des fonds IDA intervenue le 6 janvier 2006 
pour ne reprendre que le 15 mai 2006 et de ce fait la plupart des activités 
planifiées au premier semestre 2006 ont été décalées pour le second semestre 
2006 ou reportées en 2007; 
- L’adoption tardive du PTBA de l’année 2006 par le Comité Technique de 
Suivi (CTS) de la Consultation Sectorielle sur le Développement Rural 
assurant la fonction de Comité d’Orientation et de Pilotage (COP). 
 
9. Toutefois, il y a lieu de noter que le projet n’a pas été géré avec rigueur et 
compétence par l’Unité de Gestion du Projet (UGP). L'intervention du PROADEL a 
couvert 5215 Assemblées Communautaires de Développement (ACD) et 210 Cadres 
Cantonaux de Concertation pour le Développement (CCCD). Plus de 8 milliards de FCA 
ont été gérés par les communautés pour financer leurs microprojets par les procédures de 
passation de marchés communautaires. L'analyse des données de suivi-évaluation et les 
différents rapports sur les effets du projet démontrent le niveau des résultats importants 
que le projet a obtenus, parmi lesquels on peut citer les éléments suivants : 
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En matière d’accès aux infrastructures socio-économiques de la zone du projet 
 
10. le PROADEL a contribué significativement à augmenter la couverture des besoins 
en eau de 16 % à 20 % avec 204 points d’eau potable (181 forages, 21puits et 2 mini 
châteaux) réalisés (le taux de couverture issu de la situation de référence du PROADEL 
est de 16% alors que le schéma directeur de l’eau table sur 17%), à la couverture des 
besoins sanitaires (avec 11 centres de santé et 3 centres d’accueil des personnes vivants 
avec le VIH/SIDA réalisés), à l’équipement en infrastructures scolaires (avec 253 salles 
de classes construites), au renforcement des capacités des jeunes à la création d’emplois 
(création de 9 centres culturels et de formation des jeunes et adultes femmes et hommes). 
Ces infrastructures ont permis respectivement à près de 250 000 personnes d’accéder à 
l’eau potable (sur la base d’un point d’eau pour 1150 personnes (selon le schéma 
directeur de l’eau, l’hydraulique villageoise vise à donner accès à l’eau potable aux 
populations qui habitent dans des villages de moins de 2 000 personnes. Dans ce cas, les 
normes actuelles (en 2002) d’attribution de points d’eau potable établies par  
l’Administration sont les suivantes: 
- la population du village doit être supérieure à 300 personnes; 
- l’acceptation par les villageois des conditions de participation, soit la création 
d’un comité de gestion et la constitution d’une caisse-eau.), à  près de 50 000 
personnes d’accéder chaque année aux soins de santé de base (5000 personnes 
par centre de santé)  et à près de 49 000 enfants d’étudier dans des conditions 
sécurisées. En tenant compte de la taille des populations des villages couverts 
on peut estimer que près de 2 600 000 personnes ont bénéficié directement ou 
indirectement des activités du projet. 
 
11. De ce fait, les populations bénéficiaires apprécient fortement les effets très 
positifs de ces infrastructures dans l’amélioration de leurs conditions de vie. 
 
12. Ces résultats auraient pu être meilleurs si des difficultés de planification, de 
gestion, et de suivi du projet avaient été maîtrisées. Ces difficultés sont entre autres: 
- La faible mobilisation des contributions des populations bénéficiaires (il reste 
un peu plus de 400 millions de F CFA auprès des communautés bénéficiaires 
que le projet n’arrive pas à mobiliser); 
- L’insuffisance de planification adéquate dans le temps et l’espace des 
microprojets; 
- Le non payement à temps des décomptes financiers des entrepreneurs; 
- Les délais de réalisation des infrastructures qui ont en général largement 
dépassé les délais prévus; 
- L’insuffisance de suivi des chantiers par les ingénieurs-conseils dont les 
prestations de services ne sont pas régulièrement payées dans les délais; 
- L’insuffisance de suivi des activités sur le terrain par les UGL; 
 55 
 
- L’insuffisance de l’application des mesures de sauvegarde environnementales 
et sociales dans l’exécution des microprojets.  
 
En matière de Gestion Communautaire des Ecosystèmes 
 
13. Sur la base des documents exploités, 192 microprojets ont été approuvés par les 
instances locales dont 67 sont achevés et 56 en cours d’exécution et qui ont touché près 
de 72 000 bénéficiaires. Des sites pilotes ont été retenus et aménagés avec la formation de 
près de 1050 personnes sur des thèmes spécifiques divers comme la production et 
l’entretien de plants, la pisciculture, l’apiculture, les foyers améliorés etc. Ces 
microprojets ont permis entre autres le reboisement de sites dégradés, la vulgarisation de 
foyers améliorés auprès de 300 femmes pour réduire la consommation du bois, la création 
de jardins botaniques, des mises en défens de ressources halieutiques, l’aménagement de 
micro-barrages et des mares.   
En matière de mise en place et de renforcement des capacités des structures locales  
14. L’appui financier de l’AFD à travers le PROADEL a permis la mise en place de  
5215 ACD et 210 CCCD, et 19 CDSA. Ces différentes structures ont été mises en place 
et formées par des ONG locales recrutées par l’opérateur ensemblier (OE). Cela a permis 
l’élaboration et l’adoption au niveau communautaire de 174 Plans de développement 
local, démontrant ainsi une bonne capacité des communautés locales à planifier leurs 
actions prioritaires. 
 
15. Les ACD et les CCCD sont capables de définir leurs priorités et reconnaissent 
leurs droits. Aussi, 612 sessions de formations ou de campagne sensibilisation ont été 
réalisées sur 784 prévues. Au regard des chiffres enregistrés, un nombre important de 
sessions de formation ont été organisées ; cependant sur le terrain il a été constaté que les 
personnes formées ne maîtrisent pas le cycle de mise en œuvre et de gestion des 
infrastructures. Ceci atteste que la qualité de la formation est insuffisante. Ceci est liée à 
un certain nombre de contraintes qui sont entre autres : i) une durée très courte de temps 
de formation (maximum 2 jours) ii) des procédures de recrutements des ONG locales qui 
ne sont pas basés sur l’appréciation à la fois de la qualité et le coût des opérations 
envisagées, iii) l’insuffisance du suivi de ces ONG par l’OE, iv) des animateurs recrutés 
sur le tas et peu expérimentés, v) un manque de synergie d’intervention entre l’OE et 
l’UGP.  
 
16. Ainsi, dans la plupart des cas les sessions de sensibilisation ont pris le pas sur les 
sessions de formations formelles. Les rares formations dispensées par les ONG ne sont 
pas accompagnées d’outils permettant aux communautés la maîtrise de la gestion de leurs 
activités notamment dans les passations de marchés, la gestion financière, la tenue des 
réunions.  
En matière d’appui à la décentralisation:   
 
17. Les services du Ministère chargé de la Décentralisation estiment que l’exécution 
de cette composante du projet a été satisfaisante car elle a permis l’adoption de 6 projets 
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de lois et 47 projets de décrets d’application et la délimitation des territoires de 200 
communes. De plus la création des CCCD a permis de clarifier le niveau le plus pertinent 
pour l’implantation des communautés rurales. C’est ainsi que le PROADEL a permis au 
Ministère concerné d’identifier 412 communautés rurales potentielles pour les futures 
élections.  
 
18. Cependant l’appui du projet n’a pas été suffisant pour former les autres échelons 
locaux du processus de décentralisation.  
 
19. Le projet a appuyé l’Observatoire National du Foncier au Tchad par la formation 
de 10 spécialistes dans le domaine foncier et la mise en place de 3 observatoires pilotes 
locaux du foncier.  Ce qui a permis de commencer à sensibiliser les acteurs  à délivrer les 
actes fonciers au niveau communal et de prévenir les conflits sociaux. 
 
2. Les niveaux de performance sur la base des indicateurs de performance et 
déclencheurs de phase  
 
20. Le niveau de performance globale du PROADEL au cours de sa première phase 
d’exécution est globalement acceptable comme l’indique les valeurs atteintes par les 
indicateurs de performances et déclencheurs de phase. La majorité de ces indicateurs ont 
atteint et dépassé leurs cibles en fin de phase. L’objectif de développement et ces 
indicateurs ont été revus lors de la revue à mi-parcours et ont fait l’objet d’un suivi.  
 
21. Au 26 octobre 2010, la situation des indicateurs de performance et déclencheurs 
de phase se présente dans le tableau ci-après  
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Tableau 1:  Indicateurs de performance et déclencheurs de phase : 
 
Indicateurs Valeur 
initiale 
Valeur 
actuelle 
Valeur 
cible 
Commentaires 
 19 départements sur 47 sont 
couverts par le projet 0 19 19 
19 Départements ont été 
couverts par le PROADEL 
50% des Communautés ciblées 
ont élaboré et adopté leur Plan 
de Développement Local (PDL) 
dans les 11 départements 
soudaniens 
0% 102% 50% 
Le PDL étant une condition 
d’accès au financement du 
PROADEL, un engouement 
pour son élaboration est 
observé dans tous les 
départements soudaniens. 174 
PDL sur 170 prévus ont été 
adopté 
50% de ces communautés ont au 
moins mis en oeuvre un 
microprojet de leur PDL pour 
lequel la première tranche a été 
décaissée 
0% 68% 50% 
100 communautés des 147 
ciblées des 11 départements 
soudaniens ont mis en œuvre 
au moins un microprojets pour 
lequel la 1ère tranche est 
décaissée. 
75% des comités de décision 
sont en place et se sont réunis au 
moins une fois dans les 11 
départements du sud 
0% 91% 75% Les objectifs du projet ont été atteints et dépassés 
Les textes de loi de la 
décentralisation sont prêts et ont 
été adoptés par l'Assemblée 
nationale 
0 6 7 
6 lois qui permettent 
d’organiser les élections sont 
promulguées sur 7 prévues à 
partir de l’année 2006 
50% des projets de textes 
d'application sont disponibles 0 68% 50% 
47 décrets d’application sont 
déjà disponibles sur  69 prévus 
par le Ministère chargé de la 
décentralisation et permettent 
valablement d’organiser les 
élections locales. 
Le calendrier des élections 
locales (communes et 
communautés rurales) a été 
défini 
 Fait Fait 
5 février 2011 : élections 
legislatives - 2 avril 2011 : 
élection présidentielle - 25 juin 
2011 : élections locales 
Au moins 0.5% (un demi 
pourcent) des revenus pétroliers 
alloués aux secteurs prioritaires 
ont permis de financer des 
micro-projets inscrits dans les 
Plans de Développement Local 
0% 0,2% 0,5% 
Les circuits de décaissement 
des revenus pétroliers sont 
complexes : des infrastructures 
sont effectivement construites 
dans les départements où 
intervient le projet. Mais les 
montants décaissés ne sont 
connus, à part les fonds ayant 
transités par le projet dans le 
cadre de la contrepartie Etat. 
Source PROADEL 
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Dans le cadre de l’appui aux microprojets de développement local (Composante 1) 
 68 % de communautés ont mis en œuvre au moins un microprojet de leur PDL 
pour lequel la première tranche a été décaissée alors que la valeur cible en fin 
de phase est fixée à 50%; 
 
 0,2 % des revenus pétroliers alloués aux secteurs prioritaires ont permis de 
financer des microprojets inscrits dans les Plans de Développement Locaux 
alors que la valeur cible en fin de phase est fixée à 0,5 %; 
 
Dans le domaine du renforcement des capacités des communautés (composante 2) 
 91 % des comités de décision sont en place et se sont réunis au moins une fois 
alors que la valeur cible en fin de phase est fixée à 75 %. 
Dans le cadre de l’appui à la décentralisation (composante 3) 
 68 % des projets de textes d'application sont disponibles alors que la valeur 
cible en fin de phase est fixée à 50 %; 
 
 6 textes de loi de la décentralisation sont prêts et ont été adoptés par 
l'Assemblée nationale alors que la valeur cible en fin de phase est fixée à 7. 
 
En matière de gestion,  suivi et évaluation du projet (composante 4) 
 25  rapports de suivi – évaluation produits à temps sur 28 rapports attendus en 
fin de phase;  
  66 %  des marchés de biens et services exécutés conformément au plan de 
passation de marchés approuvés alors que la valeur cible en fin de phase est 
fixée à 80 %. 
3. Niveaux des réalisations physiques du projet  
 
22. La première phase du PROADEL a permis la réalisation de plusieurs activités qui 
ont touché la vie socio-économique tant au niveau local que national notamment:  
 Le financement de 341 microprojets dont les plus important sont 204 pour 
l’eau potable, 91 bâtiments scolaires soit 253 salles de classes pour 
l’éducation primaire et secondaire, 9 pour l’éducation et la sensibilisation de 
la population, 14 pour la santé, et 15 infrastructures économiques. La nature 
des microprojets réalisée dénote le caractère multisectoriel du PROADEL; 
 Pour la gestion communautaire des écosystèmes, 67 microprojets ont été 
achevés; 
 Des formations diverses et des conseils au profit des organisations 
communautaires de base qui ont porté principalement sur i) la mise en place et 
le renforcement des capacités des organes de gestion, ii) l’élaboration des 
plans de développement local, et iii) l’accompagnement dans l’élaboration, 
 59 
 
l’approbation et la mise en œuvre des microprojets issus des plans de 
développement; 
 La conduite par les Ministères partenaires de plusieurs études devant 
contribuer à l’amélioration de l’exécution du projet. Il s’agit de:  
 
(i)  l’étude sur les bases de données régionales;  
(ii)  la rédaction du livre blanc pour le schéma national et régional 
d’aménagement du Territoire effectuée par le Ministère de 
l’Aménagement du Territoire, de l’Urbanisme et de l’Habitat; 
(iii)  l’étude sur les potentialités économiques des communes;  
(iv)  l’étude sur le plan de développement communal;  
(v)   l’étude de la stratégie de communication du MCD effectuée par le 
Ministère chargée de la Décentralisation. 
 
 La réalisation de plusieurs outils méthodologiques dont les plus importants 
sont: le guide de planification participative et le guide d’élaboration des PDL; 
 
 La mise en place d’un cadre de collaboration en vue d’améliorer la synergie 
d’action avec: 
(i)  les services techniques déconcentrés dont le niveau opérationnel prévu 
par le   montage du projet (le CDSA au niveau départemental) a été 
fonctionnel; 
(ii)  les partenaires du niveau national dont le Ministère chargé de la 
décentralisation, et l’Observatoire National du Foncier;  
(iii)  les autres projets dont principalement le PSAOP intervenant sur le terrain 
pour financer des activités génératrices de revenus portées par les 
communautés de base. 
 
Il apparaît clairement que les réalisations physiques ci-dessus énumérées ont permis 
d’enregistrer au niveau des bénéficiaires plusieurs résultats (en termes d’effets) 
notamment une contribution effective des services techniques de l’Etat à l’atteinte 
des objectifs du projet et une amélioration significative des conditions de vie des 
communautés locales. 
 
4. Niveaux des réalisations financières 
 
23. Les décaissements des fonds ont été faibles notamment pour le financement des 
microprojets entre 2004 et 2007 (avant la revue à mi-parcours en 2008). Mais il s’est 
progressivement amélioré pour atteindre et dépasser pratiquement les 100 % en 2010. En 
effet, les niveaux de décaissement des fonds à la date d’achèvement par source de 
financement, par catégorie de dépense et par composante sont globalement satisfaisants 
comme l’indiquent les tableaux ci-dessous. Cependant du fait de l’épuisement des 
catégories de dépenses Ateliers/formations et fonctionnement du projet, l’Unité de 
gestion du projet a été amenée à solliciter des réallocations de fonds afin de corriger les 
déséquilibres constatés durant l’exécution du projet.  
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24. Il y a lieu de rappeler que le calcul du taux de réalisations financières est fait sur 
la base des fonds IDA libellés en Droits de Tirages Spéciaux (DTS) et convertis en 
Dollars US, les fonds AFD en Euros et les fonds de la contribution de l’Etat du Tchad et 
des Bénéficiaires en Francs CFA.  
 
4.1. Utilisation des fonds 
25. Au 30 septembre 2010, le total des fonds utilisé par composante donne des 
dépenses de 19 008 841 137  FCFA, pour un cumul d’encaissement à partir des 
différentes sources de 19  209 641 625 FCFA. La situation de trésorerie à la même date 
est de 200 800 488 FCFA 
 
4.2 Suivi financier et budgétaire 
 
Tableau N°2:  Situation du niveau de décaissement par source de financement. 
1$= 500,71 F CFA 
 
SOURCE DE 
FINANCEMENT Prévision  Réalisation 
Taux de 
réalisation 
IDA 12.538.416.098  12.129.722.856 97% 
AFD 2.997.500.000  2.292.355.455 76% 
ETAT 8.720.000.000  4.307.656.353 49% 
BENEFICIAIRES 817.500.000  279.106.473 34% 
TOTAL 25.073.416.098  19.008.841.137 76% 
Source PROADEL 
 
 
26. Commentaires du tableau N° 2: Les décaissements par source de financement 
montrent que des efforts restent à faire au niveau de l’Etat et des bénéficiaires avant la 
clôture des comptes du projet. 
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Tableau N°3:  Situation du niveau de décaissement par catégorie de dépenses. 
1$= 500,71 F CFA 
 
Catégories concernant 
les fonds de l'IDA 
Prévision (en 
FCFA) 
Réalisation (en 
FCFA) Ecarts 
Taux de 
réalisation 
Travaux 
720.076.000 704.690.356 15.385.644 98% 
Fournitures et 
véhicules 1.887.927.098 1.441.497.685 446.429.413 76% 
Services de consultants 
et audits 10.175.150.000 4.358.898.970 5.816.251.030 43% 
Formation 
716.850.000 723.850.112 -7.000.112 101% 
Dons pour micro-
projets 7.607.273.000 7.619.998.780 -12.725.780 101% 
Charges d’exploitation 3.137.780.000 3.334.549.994 -196.769.994 106% 
PPF 828.360.000 825.355.240 -3.004.760 100% 
Total  
25.073.416.098 19.008.841.137 6.064.574.961 76% 
Source PROADEL 
 
 
27. Commentaires du tableau N° 3: Les réalisations financières par catégorie de 
dépenses montrent une faible absorption des fonds de la catégorie service des consultants et 
audits (43%). 
 
Tableau N°4:  Situation du niveau de décaissement par composante. 
1$= 500,71 F CFA 
 
Composante 
Prévision  
(en FCFA) 
Réalisation 
 (en FCFA) Ecarts 
Taux de 
réalisation 
Appui aux microprojets 
de développement 7.607.273.000 7.695.640.568 -88.367.568 101% 
Renforcement des 
capacités locales 10.175.150.000 3.527.144.530 6.648.005.470 35% 
Appui au processus de la 
décentralisation 2.761.771.098 2.418.193.854 343.577.244 88% 
Appui à la gestion et Suivi 
Evaluation 4.529.222.000 5.367.862.185 -838.640.185 119% 
Total  25.073.416.098 19.008.841.137 6.064.574.961 76% 
Source PROADEL 
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28. Commentaires du tableau N° 4: Les réalisations financières par composante sont 
conformes aux proportions de départ excepté au niveau de la composante 4 (gestion, suivi 
et évaluation) où il apparaît un taux de 119%. Cette situation s’explique par le fait que les 
charges liées à la composante 4 ont mobilisé des fonds depuis l’année 2004 jusqu’à la 
prolongation du projet en 2010, soit 7 années de fonctionnement. 
5. Principales contraintes rencontrées dans l’exécution de la première phase  
 
29. Les principales contraintes rencontrées dans l’exécution de la première phase du 
PROADEL  identifiées portent sur trois principaux éléments qui sont: 
- Les contraintes liées à l’insuffisance constatée dans l’accomplissement des 
rôles des différents acteurs pendant la mise en œuvre du projet; 
- Les contraintes liées à l’insuffisance du management global du projet, 
notamment, la gestion financière, la passation des marchés, le suivi 
évaluation); 
- La capacité des communautés à jouer pleinement leurs rôles de maîtres 
d’ouvrage. 
5.1 Le rôle des différents acteurs dans la mise en œuvre du projet: 
 
30. Les rôles des différents acteurs ainsi que les partenariats établis entre eux ont été 
jalonnés de difficultés liées dans la plupart des cas au non respect du manuel d’exécution 
et de leurs cahiers de charges:  
(i) les procédures de recrutement des ONG par l’OE n’a pas respecté le principe 
du choix basé sur la qualité et le coût ; les ONG ont exécuté leurs missions 
sur la base d’un coût forfaitaire déterminé d’avance par l’OE sans tenir 
compte des spécificités du terrain, amenant du coup ces ONG à expédier 
parfois leur travail;  
(ii) les décomptes des travaux d’infrastructures préparés et soumis par les 
entrepreneurs dans la majorité des cas n’ont pas été payés dans les délais, 
provoquant ainsi de la part de ceux-ci des retards importants voire même des 
suspensions de certain chantiers;  
(iii)  l’application des mesures de sauvegarde environnementales sont 
insuffisantes et se limitent dans la plupart des cas à des plantations d’arbres 
pour les infrastructures de génie civil;  
(iv) Les ACD n’ont pas versé la totalité de leur contribution dans la majorité des 
cas par incompréhension de leurs devoirs en la matière du fait de la 
désinformation venant de diverses sources (animateurs, personnalités 
politiques etc.…). 
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6. Recommandations à prendre en compte dans la deuxième phase du Projet 
(i) En matière de renforcement des capacités locales, les unités locales devront 
avoir la responsabilité de recruter, suivre et évaluer les opérateurs prestataires 
de services; 
(ii) En matière d’appui au financement des microprojets, le projet devra disposer 
d’un spécialiste de contrôle des microprojets au niveau de chaque unité qui 
assurera la supervision des ingénieurs conseil recrutés pour garantir une 
meilleure qualité des microprojets réalisés sur le terrain. Les ingénieurs 
conseil appuieront la préparation des marchés communautaires en 
collaboration avec les responsables des UGL; 
(iii) En matière de pérennisation des investissements réalisés au profit des 
communautés, celles-ci doivent être suffisamment formées et outillées pour 
suivre la réalisation et assurer la gestion des investissements;  
(iv) La contribution demandée de la part de ces communautés doit être revue et 
adaptée aux réalités locales (contribution en nature ou en espèce).  
 
7. CONCLUSION20 
 
31. La première phase du Projet d’Appui au Développement Local a pris 
officiellement fin le 30 Juin 2010 avec une prorogation d’un an.  Au cours de cette 
première phase, le Projet a couvert  5215 ACD et 210 CCCD pour une population totale 
estimée à 6 millions d'habitants. Les résultats obtenus ont été satisfaisants. Le projet a eu un 
impact visible sur l'amélioration des conditions de vie des communautés. Les résultats 
présentés dans ce document selon la logique d’intervention ont permis de connaître 
l’importance des réalisations physiques et financières et les effets observés sur les 
bénéficiaires.  Ainsi, près de 6 milliards de FCA ont été mis à la disposition des communautés 
pour financer leurs microprojets par les procédures de passation des marchés 
communautaires. 
32. Le niveau de performance globale du PROADEL au cours de sa première phase 
d’exécution est satisfaisant comme l’indiquent les valeurs atteintes par les indicateurs de 
performances et déclencheurs de phase.  
33. Cependant, à côté des résultats relativement satisfaisants obtenus par le projet, des 
insuffisances ont été constatées tout au long des cinq années d’exécution du projet dont 
les plus importantes sont liées à la coordination générale du projet. 
34. Sur la base de ces résultats, le Gouvernement du Tchad et la Banque Mondiale ont 
entamé le processus de préparation de la deuxième phase pour éviter un long délai entre 
la clôture de la première phase et le démarrage de la seconde phase. 
 
7.2  Comments on Draft ICR 
N/A 
                                                          
20  In Rapport d’achèvement. Rapport final, octobre 2010, p. 37. 
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Annex 8:  Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders 
 
 
N/A
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Annex 9:  List of Supporting Documents 
 
General documentation: 
 
Gouvernement du Tchad: Document de Stratégie de Croissance et de Réduction de la 
Pauvreté: SNRP II: 2008-2011, April 2008 
Gouvernement du Tchad/GTZ: Recuil des Lois et Regements sur la Decentralisation, 
2008 
Republic of Chad: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2003-2006. June 2002. 
UNDP: Human Development Report 2010. 
WorldBank: Regional Integration Assistance Strategy for Central Africa. January 10, 
2003. 
World Bank: Country Assistance Strategy, World Bank report for 2004-2006(Document  
No. 26938-D) 
 
PROADEL documentation: 
 
Project Appraisal Document,  August 19, 2004 (Report No: 24101-CH) 
Development Grant Agreement; September 30, 2004 (Grant Number H126-CH) 
Mid-Term Report, June 2009 
Project Implementation Support Reports (13 reports 2003-2010) 
ISR mission aide-mémoires (11 reports 2004-2010) 
Audit reports and auditors’ management letters 2005-2009 
 
République du Tchad / MATUH / PROADEL: Etude de la situation de référence des 
départements couverts par le PROADEL.  Rapport final, SOGEC International, 
novembre 2007. 
République du Tchad / MATUH / PROADEL: Rapport d’achèvement. Rapport final, 
octobre 2010 (transmitted on 8 November 2010) 
République du Tchad / MATUH / PROADEL: Etude d’impact de microprojets et analyse 
de la satisfaction des bénéficiaires dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre du 
PROADEL. Rapport provisoire, SERF, novembre 2010 (transmitted on 29 
November 2010) 
 
PROADEL manuals:  
 
- Manuel d’Exécution, Juin 2002. 
- Manuel d’Exécution--les modalités de gestion et d’exécution par les bénéficiaires 
euxmêmes des micro-projets communautaires (Tome II). 
- Manuel d’Exécution--les modalités d’exécution par le PRODEL en maîtrise 
d’ouvrage déléguée (de routes rurales et ouvrages s'y rapportant de moyenne 
envergure) (Tome III). 
- Lutte contre la marginalisation (par Operateur ensemblier), November 2006. 
- Manuel de l’animateur et autres outils methodologiques de processus, (par 
Operateur ensemblier), 2009. 
- Manuel de suivi et evaluation du projet PRODEL, 2002, revised in 2004. 
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List of studies prepared with PROADEL funds:  
 
1. Méthodes et outils d’analyse en étude d’impact environnemental, mars – avril 
2003; 
2. La problématique foncière au Tchad, juillet 2003; 
3. Etude de faisabilité d’un projet national d’appui à la microfinance, février 2005; 
4. Mission d’appui à l’Opérateur Ensemblier du PROADEL: actualisation de la 
méthodologie: diagnostic participatif et plan de développement local, janvier- 
février 2007; 
5. Etude sur les matériaux de construction dans les zones de PROADEL, mai 2007; 
6. Elaboration du plan de communication du PROADEL, juin 2007; 
7. Diagnostic des établissements de microfinance évoluant dans la zone 
d’intervention du projet d’appui au développement local (PROADEL), août 2007; 
8. Document de méthodologie pour l’élaboration d’un microprojet environnemental, 
janvier 2008; 
9. Mission d’appui à la définition du rôle et des responsabilités des intervenants du 
PROADEL dans la mise en œuvre des microprojets villageois, mai 2008; 
10. Etude complémentaire d’identification d’une démarche adaptée pour la zone 
pilote de l’Unité de Gestion Locale de N’Djamena, juin – août 2008; 
11. Elaboration des trois modules de formation des techniciens d’appui de 
PROADEL en gestion de l’environnement : législation et réglementation en 
matière d’évaluation environnementale au Tchad, septembre 2008; 
12. Le suivi - évaluation participatif communautaire, septembre 2008; 
13. Manuel de procédures de gestion du crédit solidaire, octobre 2008; 
14. Module de formation sur le montage et analyse des microprojets – PROADEL, 
octobre 2008; 
15. Conception d’une base de données régionales, octobre 2008; 
16. L’aménagement du territoire au Tchad : Livre blanc, décembre 2008; 
17. Budget communal, janvier 2009; 
18. Elaboration et exécution du plan de développement communal, février 2009; 
19. Module de formation des formateurs en passation des marchés communautaires, 
février 2009; 
20. Etude sur la géomorphologie dans la zone soudanienne, octobre 2009; 
21. Mission de capitalisation des acquis de la planification locale et d’appui à la 
maîtrise d’ouvrage, novembre 2009. 
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